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 3 
1 Introduction 
Media provides us with information about events taking place outside of our own 
experiences. Media also compresses the events to texts and images that present the 
events to us. This process requires an act of compression in which the events are 
represented in texts and images that reflect the events themselves, as well as the 
causes and consequences related to the events. The production of news is a 
selective process of reconstructing reality from different perspectives and with 
different voices describing the events themselves. News source selection also 
impacts the initial frames of how the public understands the conflict.1 
In this study I concentrate on the frame building of the case of abducted 
Nigerian schoolgirls from Chibok in the news reporting of Helsingin Sanomat 
(HS). In April 2014, the extreme terrorist organization Boko Haram abducted a 
total of 276 girls from the Chibok secondary school in Nigeria. The case gained 
much international publicity, and it is the most well-known of the many attacks 
made by Boko Haram since it started its violent attacks in 2009. As such, the case 
also redirected attention from the other abductions and violent attacks done later 
by Boko Haram in Nigeria, many with many more victims. The case of the 
Chibok girls can also be addressed as a case reflecting religion-related terrorism 
and its connectedness to a wartime situation, abductions and gender-based sexual 
violence towards women and girls.  
This study aims to show how HS reported and framed the case of the 
Chibok girls, and what kind of frame building patterns can be found in the news in 
general. HS is the biggest Finnish daily newspaper, aimed at Finnish readers, and 
it also has resources for covering foreign news reporting.2 As such, HS news also 
reflect the foreign news transmission procedures in a Finnish newspaper. 
The study is a qualitative text analysis to identify the frame building 
patterns such as sourcing and quoting patterns of the news texts and, inductively 
the dominant frame themes found in the news texts. The news texts form a 
database where the texts are categorized by the sources, source types, quotes, 
quote types and frame theme types. The original news items are written in 
Finnish. 
 
1 Uwazuruike 2018, 70. 
2 Media Audit Finland 2019. 
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For this study I picked a total of 336 texts between April 2014 and 
December 2018, containing combinations of the words (in Finnish) “Nigeria”, 
“Boko Haram” and “schoolgirls” from the HS online news archive. From this data 
I selected those which contained at least one reference to the Chibok schoolgirls 
case. The selected news items were then marked with ID numbers from N1 to 
N125. However, after excluding overlapping duplicates the final number ended up 
to be 105 news articles.  
To identify the source and quoting patterns and recurring themes I 
categorized the news sources and referred quotes from the texts. The texts 
included 196 mentions of 41 different reference sources which were then 
categorized into nine source type categories. While each of the source types was 
only counted once per an individual news item, the total number of source types 
ended up to be 146. 
The next phase was to handpick the direct or referred quotes from the news. 
The total of 458 quotes were sorted into seven quote type categories, some of 
which contain subcategories. The number of quotes was reduced to 211 by 
referring to a quote category only once per individual news item. 
The last phase was to identify and generate recurring frame themes present 
in the news texts paragraphs.3 The recognized frame theme categories, 12 in total, 
were then categorized into four main frame groups: 1) Understanding the 
circumstances, 2) Government inactivity and politics, 3) Terrorism and violence 
and, 4) Community and compassion. These main groups also form the basis for 
the content analysis of the news data in this study and some attention is paid to the 
subcategories as well. 
My research questions in this study are: 
Research question 1: What are the sourcing and quoting patterns used in the 
HS about the Chibok schoolgirls abduction case? Where is the information from 
and who are the ones commenting on the subject?  
Research question 2: What kind of frame themes can be constructed from 
the news about Chibok girls? How do the frames emphasize (or ignore) different 
aspects of the subject? 
The structure of this thesis consists of four main themes that are meant to 
provide the reader with a concise understanding of each of the themes. The first 
 
3 In this study I chose a paragraph as an interpretative entity. In a news texts, a paragraph usually 
contains only one topic.  
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section focuses on mapping the case in the Nigerian context and provide 
information to understand the Nigerian situation with regard to its historical 
background, the rise of Boko Haram, and the case of the abducted Chibok girls. 
This case has been the most well-known attack of the many made by Boko Haram 
since it started its violence in 2009. In this part I refer to several reports, news, and 
studies about Nigeria, and the rise of the insurgency of Boko Haram. Especially 
the various reports by human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International, and individual researchers, focus on the perspective of 
the victims of Boko Haram.4 
The second part focuses on the theoretical frameworks I have used in this 
study. News framing theory, originally presented by Erwin Goffman, is an 
appropriate tool in studying media content dealing with terrorism.5 I also have 
used the publications of Scheufele, Tewksbury and Moy to complement the 
interpretation of the framing theory of media effects, and the publications of 
Uwazuruike and Lipschulz on applying framing theory in their studies of 
terrorism.6 In media research the concept of framing is an approach to understand 
the function of news production in particular. While the case consists of foreign 
news, there is also a brief reference to the theory of newsworthiness (or news 
value theory) to give a perspective to the factors that lie behind the topics to be 
selected as news.7 Newsworthiness is related to understanding the process of 
foreign news production. In this study I also refer to Abubakar’s study of violent 
extremism and news criteria in the Nigerian context.8 
In the second part I also address studies on the foreign news transmission 
process in the Finnish media context which has been studied by Kivikuru, 
Pietiläinen and Rantanen, and later by Uskali.9 These studies also reveal the uses 
of news agencies in the media content production process. In the second part I 
also elaborate on the relation between media and terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in 
the U.S.10 This relation is twofold: terrorists need media for conveying 
information about their attacks, and correspondingly, their attacks serve as 
 
4 Pearson 2018. 
5 Goffman 1986; Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007. 
6 Scheufele 1999; Scheufele & Tewskbury 2007; Moy & Tewskbury 2019; Uwazuruike 2018 & 
2018b; Lipschulz 2007. 
7 The theory of newsworthiness was first presented by Galtung & Ruge 1965. 
8 Abubakar 2020. 
9 Kivikuru & Pietiläinen 1998; Rantanen 1998; Uskali 2007. 
10 Zelizer & Allan 2011 & 2011b. 
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material for the news media and its audiences. For this end, I also elaborate on the 
relation between terrorism and media in one chapter and refer to several studies 
that address, for example, terrorism related victims, and compassion. 
The third part of this study focuses on terrorism and its victims, and its 
relation to wartime violence. One perspective to violence is the concept of 
abduction. This part of the study also includes references to the theme of conflict-
related sexual violence and gender, also in the media context.11 
In the fourth part I implement the concepts of sourcing, quoting and framing 
- from the frame building perspective - to the selected HS news data. The last 
chapter consists of reflecting the findings of the data analysis and conclusions. 
There are many restrictions in the interpretative process. The data I have 
used is media material and as such, the material already represents many levels of 
preselection and interpretation of the events and their consequences. As the study 
shows, the news data is largely based on material produced by news agencies or 
earlier material published in other international media. Focusing only on the texts 
of the data does not take into account the perspective of interlinked media 
contents and the importance of visual materials, like photos and videos. The visual 
elements contain a multitude of relevant information for the interpretation of 
media content.12 
Also, the interpretative process of recognizing the frames of the news 





11 Höijer 2004. 
12 Lipschulz 2007, 33. 
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2 Mapping the case 
To understand the rise of Boko Haram one must first understand the contexts of 
its insurgency. This chapter concentrates on giving the background information 
about Nigeria and its history as well as the context for the rise of Boko Haram and 
the case of the abducted Chibok girls.  
2.1 Mapping Nigeria 
Nigeria is a country of contradictions. It has rich natural resources like oil, and 
subsequently oil-related industries, but the state of social welfare in the country is 
poor. This sub-Saharan country is the most populous in Africa with 195.9 million 
inhabitants.13 According to the World Population Prospect 2015 drafted by the 
UN, Nigeria’s population will exceed that of the United States by 2050.14 Life 
expectancy in Nigeria is low: 55 years for men and 56 years for women.15 Over 
half of the population is under 30 years of age.16 
Nigeria is also the third biggest and fastest growing economy in Africa and 
from this perspective it also attracts investors. However, issues with security, poor 
infrastructure and continuous power struggles in the country slow down economic 
development and curb foreign investments in the country.17 
The country has suffered from longstanding ethnic and religious tensions. 
The different religious groups have been involved in the conflicts, and especially 
since 2002 the extreme Sunni Muslim group Boko Haram has entered the picture. 
The country is roughly divided to the South with a Christian majority and to the 
North where most of the Muslims live, but, according to the Nigerian 
Constitution, the country is a democratic secular State and it does not have any 
State religions18.  
According to a CNN analysis,19 in the Northern Nigeria region 
unemployment is pervasive and the government is not able to provide security, 
education, nor functioning infrastructure. Several sources confirm that the state 
authorities themselves have been involved in several acts of violence, thereby 
 
13 UNDR 2019. 
14 MDG 2015. 
15 WHO 2016. 
16 WFP 2020. 
17 BBC 2020b. 
18 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.  
19 CNN 2014. 
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violating the international human rights principles.20 Nigeria ranks 158th of the 
total 189 countries in the Human Development Index.21  
Nigeria is a country of contradiction in the sense of conflict resolution as 
well. The country’s historical development has been unstable, but, since gaining 
its independence 1960, it has been involved in conflict resolution processes in 
various parts in Africa and more widely in the world as well. Work for world 
peace has been a pillar of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives.22 Africa in general is 
known to be one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world. Most of the 
conflicts are arms-driven and according to estimations the causes of these 
conflicts have a socio-economic background.23  
Nigeria is a former British colony dating back to the early 19th century. In 
the first half of the 20th century, the British government repeatedly attempted to 
unify the big country into one nation, but the various Nigerian tribes with their 
historically different ethnic backgrounds, traditions and religions did not show 
any willingness to unite. The history of the British rule still bears its mark in the 
current political, economic and social structures. Despite the past, colonialism is 
not the cause of the current crisis that has deep roots in the ethno-religious history 
of the country.24  
In his book Nation as Grand Narrative Wale Adebanwi25 writes about the 
ethno-religious competition and rivalries in the northern part of the country. One 
example of this tension dates back to the beginning of the 19th century when the 
dominant ethnic and largely “pagan” group Hausa was conquered by the Fulanis 
during the jihad in 1804. After their defeat, the Hausas largely adopted Islam, the 
religion of the Fulanis, as their religion and the Fulani conquerors adopted the 
Hausa language. These two groups became intertwined and formed a group called 
Hausa-Fulani, and the Hausa language became the lingua franca in the northern 
parts of the country. The Hausa-Fulani group also sought to incorporate smaller, 
especially non-Muslim ethnic groups to their culture and Islam, but there are still 
counterhegemonic challenges in the area. During the years of conflict, also 
 
20 Amnesty International 2014. 
21 UNDP 2019. 
22 Dokubo & Oluwadare 2011. 
23 Dokubo & Oluwadare 2011. 
24 Adebanwi 2016. 
25 Adebanwi 2016. 
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minority ethno-religious groups that were not directly involved in the main crises 
were attacked and brought into it. 
In Nigeria the ethnicity and religion are also connected to the land 
ownerships, politics and distribution of resources, and this differentiation is 
grounded in the national law as well. Kwaja in his document writes how the 
“original” inhabitants of a local government area, or members of ethnic groups in 
Nigeria have certain “indigeneship certificates” that have an impact in many day-
to-day situations in the country. The historic background of the distribution of this 
certificate lies originally in the minority groups’ concern that their traditional 
customs and authority structures are eroded by the overwhelmingly larger ethnic 
and religious groups. In practise the certificate indicates who is a native inhabitant 
of a particular location and, by extension, also who can participate in politics, own 
land or obtain a job. The others are considered as migrants or “settlers”. The 
Nigerian constitution as well as the Federal Character Commission, which is a 
statutory institution to ensure the distribution of equities and political power, also 
recognizes the validity of this certificate. However, as Chris Kwaja notes, the 
definition of the indigeneship and issuing the certificates has been extraordinarily 
arbitrary and it has also contributed to the tension and conflicts that have emerged 
in between different groups.26 
Against this background, the roots of the Nigerian crises – although it from 
the general perspective is polarized on the relation between North and South, and 
the Muslims and the Christians – have been more about who the dominant and the 
dominated ethnic groups are. In his book Adebanwi describes how this political, 
cultural, economic and religious domination interconnects with the economic 
inequality in the northern parts of Nigeria.27 
Northern Nigeria is predominately Muslim, with substantial Christian 
minorities in several states. Nigerian Islam is formed of several distinct Sufi 
orders, small Shi’a communities, and Salafi interpretations of Islam which is 
reflected in various movements. The best known of the radical Islamic movements 
in the country is Boko Haram. Christian denominations include Catholics (1/4 of 
Christians), Anglicans and other Protestants, African Initiated Churches, and 
decentralized Pentecostal churches (“born agains”), whose numbers have shown 
remarkable growth. The extremist views among some churches and leaders are 
 
26 Kwaja 2011. 
27 Adebanwi 2016, 12–16, 234–237. 
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quite common. Traditional religious beliefs are weak in numbers, partly because 
of their adhesion to Christianity or Islam. There also are small communities of 
other global religious traditions like Hindu, Baha’i, and Buddhist.28 
Of the 374 ethnic groups in Nigeria the three largest groups constitute more 
than half of Nigeria’s entire population; Hausa-Fulani in the North (29%), Yoruba 
in the Southwest (21%) and Igbo in the Southeast (18%). The eight largest groups 
are almost a two third of the population and the other ethnic groups fit into the 
minority category. The Hausa-Fulani and other communities in Northern Nigeria 
are mainly Muslim and, the southern minorities and Igbo speaking areas in the 
Southeast are predominantly Christian. The North-central zone of Nigeria is a 
mixture of Christian and Muslim populations. The Yoruba-speaking communities 
in the Southwest are divided to about half and half Muslims and Christians.29 
 
Figure 1. Nigeria's ethnic and religious diversity. Source: Kwaja 2011, based on Ulrich Lamm. 
The other ethnic groups belong to the minorities. The largest minority 
groups are the Ijaw, Kanuri, Edo, Ibibio, Nupe, Igala, Berom, Kambari, Ekoi, and 
the Tiv (Figure 1). About 50 per cent of these ethnic minorities, 170 million in 
total, are Muslims, and of the estimated share of Christians is 40 per cent.30 
Nigeria declared its independency from the United Kingdom in 1960, but 
the cultural and political differences between the main ethnic groups led the 
country into civil war during 1967 – 1970. Military juntas and dictators governed 
 
28 WFDD 2018. 
29 Okpanachi 2012. 
30 Salaam 2012. 
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the country until the democratic development in 1999. The history in the country 
seems to be full of violent conflicts and instability between different religious and 
ethnic groups. The conflicts have had an impact on the later development in the 
country and they have also affected the foreign relations and economic 
development of Nigeria.31 
Washington Post’s headline on May 10, 2015 “The Nigerian military is so 
broken, its soldiers are refusing to fight”32 is telling of the situation of the military 
forces in the country. According to the article, joining the battles equals to 
committing suicide, and several soldiers have refused to join the battles – and 
some have even been sentenced to death due to refusal to fight.33 
The article states that Nigeria’s defence budget is among the biggest in Sub-
Saharan Africa but much of it is lost to corruption.34 According to Amnesty 
International, the military and defence budget in Nigeria has increased massively 
since the beginning of the Nigeria’s Northeast conflict in 1999. However, the 
money has not reached the frontline, the government’s operations have remained 
under-resourced and corruption is prevalent.35  
The armed military forces play a significant role as a national institution, but 
they lack investments in training, maintaining equipment and cooperation with 
Western forces.36 
Amnesty International has published a report concerning the war crimes 
committed by the Nigerian military forces. According to the report, by 2015 these 
forces had executed more than 1,200 people and arrested at least 20,000 people.37 
Countless cases demonstrate the continuing use of torture in Nigeria, not only by 
the government forces including the police, but by Boko Haram as well.38 
Most of the arrested have been men and boys. Amnesty International’s 
report is based on more than 412 interviews of victims, eyewitnesses, journalists 
and military officials, and more than 800 official documents. It also reveals that 
 
31 Okpanachi 2012. 
32 Washington Post 2015. 
33 See N72 (December 18, 2014). The Nigerian army field court condemned 54 soldiers to death 
because they refused to fight against Boko Haram. The soldiers said they did not have sufficient 
armament. against the heavily armed Boko Haram forces. 
34 Global security 2015. 
35 Amnesty International 2015. 
36 Global security 2015b. 
37 Amnesty International 2015. 
38 According to Amnesty International’s report (2014) torture and ill-treatment are a routine in 
police investigations across Nigeria, as is raping women, especially sex workers. Torture is also 
one of the means for Boko Haram to cause fear within their area of operations. 
12 
  
hundreds or even thousands of Nigerians have enforcedly disappeared and at least 
7,000 people have died in military detention due to starvation, or as result of 
inadequate medical assistance.39  
2.2 The background behind the rise of Boko Haram 
The rise of military terrorist sect Boko Haram, especially in the Northeast areas of 
Nigeria, has been one of the main drivers of the instability in the country in the 
2000’s. As noted earlier, Boko Haram is not the only cause of conflicts, but the 
unstable situation has been formed of a complex web of socio-cultural, economic, 
ethno-religious and regional elements. There is a plethora of violent acts caused 
by corruption, religious and ethnic issues, and politics, as well as an inability to 
implement laws to ensure national development.40  
In their article, Mohammed Suleiman and Mohammed Karim41 have studied 
the different factors behind the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. They refer to a 
study by Salaam42 that states that the disparity of the northern and southern 
regions has played a major role in the rise of militant groups; the northern part of 
the country has remained a backward in Western education both before and after 
Nigeria gained its independence from the United Kingdom. The study states that 
in the northern part of the country Western education was considered a tool used 
by Christian missionaries, and this stance has continued until current times. They 
also state that this gap is growing wider as the population increases. However, in 
addition to Boko Haram, numerous sects have emerged in Northern Nigeria 
following the independence of the country. Alongside religious differences and 
rivalry of the various religious sects, the worsening socio-economic situation, 
poverty and unemployment, as well as poor governance and pervasive corruption 
in public governance, have been major triggers for the rise of Boko Haram. In this 
sense, instead of the religion, the level of social injustice has been the major 
reason for the rise of this extreme Islamic movement.43  
Boko Haram’s attacks have been targeted at Christians, students, traditional 
leaders, Muslims who oppose their activities, and civil servants and their family 
 
39 Amnesty International 2015. The report tells about extrajudicial executions of which one took 
place in 14.3.2014, when the military killed at least 640 men and boys, mostly recaptured 
detainees. In another execution in March 2014, the military killed at least 622 people. 
40 Hassan et al. 2016, 427. 
41 Suleiman & Karim 2015. 
42 Salaam 2012. 
43 Suleiman & Karim 2015. 
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members. Boko Haram’s attacks have been unpredictable, and they also have 
burned numerous churches, some with worshippers trapped inside, killed men 
who refused to convert to Islam, and abducted Christian women.44  
The publicly announced, ultimate objective of Boko Haram has been the 
establishment of an Islamic State under the Sharia law in Nigeria, and the group 
uses religion as its ideology, declaring themselves to have the true interpretation 
of the Islamic faith. They also use religion as an instrument for recruiting new 
soldiers, to legitimise extreme violence, and as a criterion to select the targets of 
their attacks.45 
Contrary to the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria with infrastructure, 
urban centres and territories under its governance for sustained period, Boko 
Haram has not implemented long-term governance systems, nor has it held 
territories long-term.46 Although Maiduguri47, the capital of Borno State, has been 
near occupation by Boko Haram, and with the group controlling a large territory 
in Borno, the extremist group has not been able to establish itself in an urban 
centre. The city of Maiduguri has been “ground zero” for Boko Haram. It is where 
the movement was founded, and where its founder Mohammed Yusuf was killed 
by the police 2009. Boko Haram has occupied territories in the neighbourhood, 
but it is unclear to which extent it governs the territory. Its insurgency has also 
destroyed infrastructure. 48  
According to Greg H. Ezeah and Nathan O. Emmanuel,49 it’s not clear how 
and who started Boko Haram’s operations in 2002. However, Uwazuruike50, 
admitting that the origins of the group are not clear, refers to claims that the group 
was founded as a non-violent socio-religious movement already in 1995. At that 
time its name was Ahl al-Sunna wa Jama’a al-Hijra (People Committed to Hijra 
and the Prophet’s Teachings).  
 
44 HRW 2012. 
45 Brinkel & Ait-Hida 2014. 
46 Pearson 2018, 49. 
47 Campbell 2020a. Maiduguri is also the residence of the Shehu of Borno, one of Nigeria’s most 
important traditional Islamic religious rulers. The city is located on the main Muslim pilgrimage 
route (Hajj) from Senegal from the Western Africa to Mecca. The city is a trading center of 
agriculture and cattle. Due to the poverty of the area Maiduguri is sometimes called “the beggar 
maker.” Also see Los Angeles Times 2014. 
48 Campbell 2020b. According to this blog, posted in January 2020, locals are afraid that Boko 
Haram will isolate Maiduguri and Borno state areas from the rest of Nigeria. 
49 Ezeah & Emmanuel 2016. 
50 Uwazuruike 2018b, 20. 
14 
  
Human Rights Watch51 reports about a group of about 200 people including 
university students and unemployed youth who migrated to Yobe state in 
Northeastern Nigeria to set up a camp. The name of the group in Arabic is 
“Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad”, which means “People Committed 
to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”52. HRW53 reports how 
the group “sought to withdraw from the “corrupt,” “sinful,” and “unjust” secular 
state of Nigeria and form a new community based on Islamic law”. HRW 
describes in more detail the early stages and attacks of the group, also called the 
Nigerian Talebans, since 2003. 
Uwazuruike describes how after the death of its early leader Mohammed Ali 
in a shootout in 2003 the leadership was passed on to Mohammed Yusuf and how 
the group then, according to its leader’s name, was called Yusufiya (the followers 
of Yusuf). Many also refer to Mohammed Yusuf as the first leader of Boko 
Haram. This is possibly because of the group’s recruitment efforts and its 
expansion to the Northeast under Yusuf’s leadership.54 
The popular name Boko Haram, roughly meaning “Western education is 
forbidden”55, was given to the group by residents in the city of Maiduguri in 
Northeastern Nigeria and the name was popularized by local and foreign press. 
The group represents a version of Islam that forbids Muslims from taking part in 
 
51 Human Rights Watch 2012. 
52 Abubakar (2020, 280) explains that Boko Haram’s actual name is Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna lid 
Da’awatu wal-Jihad which is translated to approximately “Movement for the Propagation and 
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Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad’ to mean “People Committed to the Propagation 
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education” or “Western influence” and “haram” in Arabic means “sinful” or “forbidden.” 
Uwazuruike (2018b, 18) also refers to a translation “Movement for the Propagation of Tradition 
and Struggle”. He writes that the group has also operated under the names Ahlusunna wal’ Jamma 
Hijra, the Nigerian Taliban, and the Yusufiyya. 
53 Human Rights Watch 2012. 
54 Uwazuruike 2018b, 18. 
55 There are other translations of Boko Haram as well. Human Rights Watch explains the Hausa 
term to be derived from one of Yusuf’s main teachings that asserts that Western-style education 
(boko) is religiously forbidden (haram) under Islam. Thurston (2013) elaborates the etymology in 
wider cultural and linguistic context in his blog text. He writes that there is some debate about the 
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the Romanized Hausa script. If the word is understood as a corruption of the English word “book,” 
it links it strongly to educational contexts. On the other hand, in Hausa context the word means 
fake or deceitful, and it appears in contexts other than just education. Thurston sums up that Boko 
Haram means something like, “Western culture is Islamically forbidden” or “the Westernized 
elites and their way of doing things contradict Islam.” He also recalls that “in addition to attacking 
Western education, Yusuf also forbade Muslims from working for secular governments.” 
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education or social activities that are associated with Western ideology or 
influence.56  
The leader of Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf founded an Islamic school in 
which Muslim parents from both Nigeria and the neighbouring countries enrolled 
their children. In addition to regular Islamic education, Boko Haram also 
specialized in military training that revealed the political goals of the group to 
establish an Islamic State in Nigeria.57 The group later changed its name to Islamic 
State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and became an affiliate of the Islamic 
State, IS, also known as ISIS.58  
The larger-scale armed conflicts in Northeast Nigeria date back to 2009 
when Boko Haram started a violent campaign against the Nigerian Government. 
Five days of violent battles in July 2009 between the group and security forces 
ended in execution-style killings by both sides and caused the death of more than 
800 people in the Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, and Kano states, including the group’s 
leader Mohammed Yusuf.59 During the conflict both parties committed serious 
violations. The situation has developed to a domestic conflict partly due to Boko 
Haram’s well-organized force, recruitment, command structure and controlled 
territory.60 After the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram adopted Yusuf’s deputy Abu 
Mohammad Abubakar ibn Mohammad al-Shakwi, better known as Abubakar 
Shekau, as its new leader.61 
Why do young men join Boko Haram in Nigeria? Understanding youth 
radicalization and religious extremism requires understanding the underlying 
drivers. In a situation where the state is not able to provide security, reliable 
infrastructure or public services, terrorist forces with economic resources and 
support from external jihadists (ISIS in the case of Boko Haram) and weapons 
attract young, uneducated and unemployed men in an unstable situation.62 
Factors that drive radicalization in Northern Nigeria also include the 
ignorance of “true” teaching of religion, which provides the youth with radical or 
distorted views of religion. The poverty as well as socio-cultural factors like poor 
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upbringing and neglect of children enhance the vulnerability of young people and 
make them targets of recruitment by extremist terrorist groups.63 On the other 
hand, the absence of protective factors make young people, who are trying to find 
answers to the inadequacies in the society, turn to religious radicalism.64 
Human Rights Watch also describes how boys are often given the option of 
joining or getting killed, and how some men are targets of abduction because of 
their special skills or occupation.65 There are also several cases where Boko 
Haram has kidnapped young men.66 
In their study Anneli Bohta and Mahdi Abdile67 found out that there are 
various reasons for individuals to join Boko Haram. Botha and Abdile interviewed 
a total of 119 former Boko Haram fighters in IDP camps and 60 peace builders 
from non-governmental organizations (NGO) and included a citizen survey of 
1607 respondents in the study. While the peacebuilders in institutions working 
towards peace consider religion to be the most prominent reason (82%) to join the 
group, and in the citizen survey the same perception was shared by 54,1%, only 
9,2% of Boko Haram respondents identified religion to have been the main reason 
in joining the group.  
The study revealed that economic reasons like the lack of employment 
opportunities coupled with the lack of education were the key factors in creating 
frustration that had an impact on people’s decision to join Boko Haram. Other 
reasons for joining Boko Haram were the need to be respected (23,0%) and the 
need to belong (16,8%). Instead, 57% of former Boko Haram fighters identified 
revenge directed at the state and the security forces as a strong or being the only 
factor for joining the movement.68 
Against the perception that the madrassas69, religious schools and mosques 
are the venues where people are radicalized and recruited to Boko Haram, the 
 
63 Cleen Foundation 2014. 
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progress was made in terms of civilization.  He writes that many northern Muslims retained the 
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study indicated that the first introduction to Boko Haram was through friends and 
family, people close to them. Only 14,3% of the former Boko Haram fighters 
indicated mosques as venues of recruitment and 12,6% of the respondents 
mentioned madrassas.70 
The fear of retribution has prevented local people from publicly resisting 
Boko Haram terrorism or the girls who have escaped Boko Haram’s 
imprisonment to openly discuss what has happened to them. Tens of thousands of 
civilians have fled to neighbouring countries Chad, Cameroon and Niger for the 
fear of Boko Haram.71 On the other hand, local women have also been reported to 
be among the early supporters of Boko Haram. This is partly due to the religious 
ideology Boko Haram represents, where the group offers a means to gain religious 
knowledge, or due to the set-up where men are the frontline fighters and women 
are reported to be mostly in organizational roles, like recruitment of new members 
or spying.72 However, the study of former Boko Haram members revealed that 
women also worked as soldiers, recruiters and handled explosives.73 
The Nigerian government has declared several states of emergency in some 
provinces due to Boko Haram’s violent attacks. The most well-known of their 
violent attacks was the abduction of over 300 Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014.74 
In 2020, more than 100 of these girls are still in the hands of their kidnappers 
despite the domestic and international attempts to influence the Nigerian 
government to get them free. At least the US, UK and France have helped 
Nigerian military forces in their attempts to fight Boko Haram.75 The abduction of 
the Chibok schoolgirls and the wide international media publicity also helped 
Boko Haram and its leader Abubakar Shekau to legitimize its use of gender-based 
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violence (GBV) on both Christian and Muslim women in Northeastern Nigeria 
and later female suicide bombers. Boko Haram, like the Islamic State ISIS, abuses 
women and uses its interpretation of Islamic theology to justify this violence.76 
Boko Haram’s actions have resulted in unmeasurable human suffering, 
thousands of deaths, injuries and forced displacements.77 Over 100,000 refugees 
have fled from Northeastern Nigeria to neighbouring countries.78 According to 
OCHA,79 more than 27,000 people have been killed. Almost 1.8 million people in 
the northeastern part of the country live in camps for internally displaced people 
(IDP), 80 percent of them and women and girls. More than 7 million people 
depend on the urgent humanitarian aid by the United Nations World Food 
Programme (WFP) and its partners.80  
The battles and violent actions have caused insecurity that has a wider impact 
on the livelihoods of communities in the region. The fear of violence prevents the 
farmers from cultivating their fields and the locals from running their businesses. 
The aid organizations have not been safe from the attacks either.81  
Boko Haram has changed its modes of action during the years. In his 
dissertation Uwazuruike refers to a study on the four-stage evolution of Boko 
Haram from missionary activism to transnational violence: 1) substate missionary 
activism, 2) substate jihadist and an al-Qaeda connection, 3) nationalist jihadist 
and al-Qaeda affiliation, and 4) transnational jihadism and integration into AQIM 
(Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and ISIS.82 
According to HRW it seems that until 2013 Boko Haram did not appear to 
target women and girls specifically, but instead assaulted primarily the perceived 
unjust and corrupted system and its representatives like security services, police 
forces, politicians and civil servants. Schools and students became its targets in 
early 2012.83 Boko Haram now frequently uses teenage female suicide bombers, 
many of whom are abducted girls, including the Chibok girls. Boko Haram has also 
used the girls as bargaining chips in negotiations with authorities to set their own 
imprisoned members free.84 
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The emigration of civilians is just one factor to show that the actions of 
Boko Haram are not of a concern of Nigeria only. As ACLED data shows, suicide 
bombings and other attacks by Boko Haram have caused deaths also in Cameroon, 
Chad, and Niger.85 According to a report of Combating Terrorism Center, Boko 
Haram used women suicide bombers the first time in June 2014, in an attack on 
military barracks in Gombe State, Nigeria.86 By March 2018, a total of 469 female 
suicide bombers have been deployed or arrested in 240 incidents in Nigeria and its 
neighbour countries. In these incidents more than 1,200 people have been killed 
and more than 3,000 people have been injured. Using female suicide bombing has 
been a terrorist tactic for creating fear, killing civilians, sending a symbolic 
message to diverse audiences, and asserting power over governments and 
communities. It seems, however, that Boko Haram has not used female suicide 
bombers as “willing martyrs”.87 
Figure 2 shows the number of deaths by states, totalling to almost 29 
thousand in Nigeria during 2011–2019. Northeastern Borno state is the epicentre 
of Boko Haram’s violence. 
 
Figure 2. A screenshot from The Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) showing the deaths by states, totalling to 
almost 29,000 in Nigeria 2011–2019. 
According to Reuters,88 Boko Haram has been losing its territories due to 
counter-attacks by the Nigerian army and its allies from the neighbour countries 
Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger. Although fighting the unstable terrorist group 
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is a mutual target, cooperation between the countries is not self-evident. Each of the 
neighbouring countries also tries to prevent Boko Haram from entering their 
territories. Fighting terrorism also means crossing the borders in the sparsely 
populated, rural and rough area, which requires bilateral negotiations and mediation 
attempts.  
However, in Boko Haram’s areas of operation the territories of ethnic groups 
are not aligned with national borders which were drawn up during the era of colonial 
rule by European states.89 
In 2019 Nigeria ranked third in the Global Terrorism Index. According to this 
report Boko Haram’s sala-jihadi insurgency has led to 35,000 combat-related deaths 
and 18,000 deaths from terrorism since 2011 in the Lake Chad Basin region. The 
report also states that the profile of Boko Haram differs from the other terrorist 
groups because of the high proportions of women and children; two-thirds of the 
suicide bombers are female, and of these one in three is a child. 90 
The group has split to multiple factions due to internal rifts. The two main 
factions are ISWAP (ISIL-aligned Islamic State West African Province), led by 
Musab al-Barnawi, and the followers of Abubakar Shekau. Both factions are 
targeting attacks against the Nigerian government. The followers of Shekau also 
are targeting all Muslims who do not follow Shekau.91	
2.3 The case of the Chibok girls 
On April 15, 2014 a total of 276 schoolgirls who were taking their final West	
African	School	Certificate	examinations92 were kidnapped from the Chibok 
Government Secondary School in Borno State, Nigeria. The kidnappers, who 
were fighters of the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram, took the girls with trucks 
to a forest area where the terrorists had set up their camps.93 
Chibok has been presented as a Christian town. After the abduction Shekau, 
the leader of Boko Haram, claimed on a video that the abducted schoolgirls were 
Christians who later converted to Islam and were married off. This kind of 
statement also reflected the religious undertones in the news reporting on Boko 
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Haram’s attack.94 Other sources, including the Christian Association of Nigeria 
(CAN), confirmed that 90% of the girls were Christians.95 
The Chibok school attack and the abduction of the girls were not the first 
ones carried out by Boko Haram. Just some weeks before the Chibok attack Boko 
Haram had attacked a school in the northeastern village of Buni Yadi. There they 
allowed the female students to flee, but slaughtered more than 40 boys in their 
dormitory. This attack gained only little media attention.96 Boko Haram’s first 
abduction of a larger group of women and girls took place in June 2013 from 
police barracks in the town of Bama.97 
According to a local government official in Nigeria, the number of the 
kidnapped girls was at first reported to be about one hundred.98 On the second day 
after the kidnapping, a local military representative stated that almost all the girls 
had been released.99 The official information lacked reliability and the number 
varied depending on the source. According to a local police commissioner, just at 
the beginning of May 2014, a total of 329 girls between ages 16 to 18 were 
kidnapped and of them 53 succeeded in escaping at once.100 During the attack, the 
terrorists also killed the school security guards and a police officer, and burned 
buildings.101 However, it has been alleged that there were many inaccuracies about 
the event and the delays of informing about it.102  
The kidnapping gained a lot of publicity in the news media in a matter of 
days. In addition to the exact number of the girls, many other facts concerning the 
case remained uncertain. Depending on the news source, the girls were reported to 
have been rescued and returned home,103 forced to convert to Islam, to serve as 
cooks or sex slaves or, after having converted to Islam, been sold as wives for 
Boko Haram soldiers or to men in the neighbouring countries Cameroon and 
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Chad. The price of a bride was reported to be equivalent to 12 USD.104 Some 
sources said the women and girls were kidnapped to be wives to soldiers who did 
not have enough money to pay for a bride.105 On the other hand, Boko Haram 
fighters followed local traditions. Oirola in his article notes: “Insurgents who are 
marrying off prepubescent girls are not doing anything that the local population is 
not already familiar with.”106 
Information of the actions taken by the police and government 
representatives also varied a lot. For the locals in Nigeria it seemed that the 
military and the authorities could not prevent the attack, nor solve it, or protect the 
victims from violence.107 The families of the missing girls started efforts to 
influence international human rights organisations, like the United Nations, and to 
attract international attention to the case to get help.108 They held demonstrations 
and rallies, trying to make an impact that would lead to political or military 
actions against Boko Haram.   
The missing girls also became a hot topic in social media discussions. One 
of the best-known social media campaigns has been the hashtag 
#BringBackOurGirls that first appeared on April 23, 2014 on Twitter. Since then, 
the campaign has grown to an international social media movement and, in 2014, 
the hashtag had been used more than 3.3 million times on Twitter only.109 As an 
example, a tweet of the First Lady of the USA with a picture of her holding a 
paper with the words #BringBackOurGirls was retweeted over 57,000 times. 
There have also been rallies and demonstrations all over the world to raise 
awareness on the case. The still ongoing campaign also became a movement for 
politicians, celebrities and other observers to promote human rights, education for 
women, and to fight violence against women.110 
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Several studies examined the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. In some them 
the type of agency the individual public reactions represent has been described as 
mere “clicktivism”, “slacktivism”, or “easy armchair activism”.111 The argument is 
that sharing social media content is not a real act or participation, but just using 
technology to share content without being involved personally.112 On the other 
hand, the massive media attention the case received put the Chibok girls in the 
centre of the conflict reporting regarding Boko Haram. It also became an indicator 
in the attempts to defeat Boko Haram. There have been other severe attacks made 
by Boko Haram, but they have not gained such wide international publicity as the 
Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction did. This also shows the relevance of the media in 
determining what is important in conflicts.113 
The perspective of the victims of the Chibok attack and individual stories of 
the abducted girls have been documented in more details in the reports of Human 
Rights Watch, UNICEF and Amnesty International. The reports also state that the 
rape of Boko Haram abducted women and girls has been underreported due to the 
culture of silence, stigmatization and shame around sexual abuse in Nigeria’s 
conservative North.114  
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3  Theoretical approach of the analysis 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical frameworks of this study. There are three 
theoretical approaches explained with a reference to reporting terrorism and 
violent extremism: news framing theory, newsworthiness (or news value) theory, 
and the concept of foreign news transmission. The last part of this chapter 
describes the relation of media and terrorism, especially after the 9/11 attacks. 
3.1 Framing theory 
The news media has a significant role in influencing the audience’s attitudes, 
cognition and behaviour. It also shapes the collective understanding of how we 
perceive and respond to media contents115, or events outside our own experiences. 
In media research the concept of framing is an approach to understand production, 
content and the possible influence of media, and due to this, framing the news 
should be seen more as a function of news processes.116 
The theory of framing117 - or framing analysis - was first presented by Erwin 
Goffman118. He assumed that an individual cannot understand the world, and 
constantly struggles in trying to make sense of the world around. According to the 
theory we tend to interpret our perceptions, as well as events, within some primary 
frameworks. These primary frameworks may be socially and culturally 
constructed belief systems or ideologies, and they offer us a perspective to 
interpret and understand or to approach the perception. As Goffman writes, all the 
social frameworks involve rules which vary depending on the context.119 Through 
these “primary frameworks” an individual can process and interpret the 
information meaningfully.120 
In media effect research framing represents social constructivism where 
media sets the frames that the public uses in interpreting and discussing public 
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events.121 There are two primary and interlinked stages in the framing process: the 
frame-building, how the media frames are built and the content presented, and 
frame-setting that refers to the audience; how the media contents are 
comprehended and how the media frames are adopted in understanding the media 
contents. The media frames refer to the process of organizing the everyday reality 
to story-lines and essential contents, but also to working routines of journalists, 
when they identify and process the information. In this process of selection, 
framing and presenting the motives can also be unconscious.122 Individual frames 
have been defined to be a “mentally stored cluster of ideas that guide an 
individual’s processing of information.”123 
Framing theory is very applicable in approaching the media contents; how 
the issue is characterized in the media can influence the way it is also 
understood.124 Frame-building takes place when a journalist constructs the news 
from the information available. Also, journalistic routines and ideological or 
political orientation of the journalist has its impact on framing the contents.125 A 
journalist gathers, selects, processes and publishes the news according to media 
preferences, standards and rules. The news has its conventional story-line, which 
organizes the structure of the news for the readers and by this, also the concept of 
understanding the topic.126 A frame in the media context means content selection; 
the selected aspect to write about the perceived reality, or the way to define the 
problem and interpret the causality.127 
Understanding and recognizing the possible influences requires careful 
analysis of media content. Framing is a technique to analyse what is central in the 
news, which are “symbolic” human products, and it includes decisions that a 
journalist makes to produce the news for an audience. To select a certain way of 
covering or telling the story also means rejecting many other perspectives. 
Because of this, framing the news should not be seen as biases, but as a function 
of news process. Media selects a narrow slice of newsworthy reality, which may 
include people, facts, issues, or events, and rejects many other possibilities.128 
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In the study of terrorism, framing offers a tool to address political agendas 
and enemies, racial and cultural identities, and the agenda-building perspectives of 
terrorism. The framing of terrorism can be understood from a cultural perspective, 
but as well from that of politics: by labelling terrorism government, military or 
academic sources may emphasize the state security lapses and shift the focus to 
violence rather than the political aspects of violence. For this, media practitioners 
should employ more diverse and alternative descriptions and avoid common 
frames and stereotypical portrayals.129 
An essential part of the framing process - and especially the frame building 
process - of media is understanding the importance of news sources. As 
Uwazuruike writes, the “sources set the tone for the framing of news events 
especially in conflicts, as various actors in a conflict try to influence the media 
reports about that conflict”. This does not, however, undermine the active role of 
journalists in the process of frame building. The journalists choose the sources, 
ask relevant questions and use quotes in the news stories.130 The sources also are 
believed to play a notable role in the process of determining what becomes a 
news.131 
The sources - and especially the official sources that are easier to find than 
conflicting voices - have their impact in shaping what becomes news. The official 
sources are also more easily recognized as legitimate bearers of facts and thus the 
sources that have access to media are generally institutions that deal with the 
power in the society, like police and the government, or elite sources like the large 
corporations.132 Also, the debates about how to resolve conflicts remain largely 
dominated by politicians and military officers, and the civilians, who suffer from 
the conflicts, are quite often excluded from the debates.133 
In his article Aeron Davis134 describes the relation of news media and 
political sources. This relation is recognized to be important from the perspective 
of functioning democratic societies and the reporter-source exchange has an 
impact on shaping the news contents and thus the public understanding of politics. 
Politicians attempt to manage journalists in their seeking for favourable media 
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coverage, and the journalists, as the “fourth estate”, try to process the news with 
their professional norms and autonomy. Despite this media-source conflict, both 
parties are dependent on each other in fluctuating cooperation; politicians in their 
need for publicity and the journalists in their need of high-level access to 
information. Journalists also contribute to the information-gathering needs of the 
politicians. 
In conflict-related reporting it is more likely that the journalists try to use a 
wider range of sources. Berkowitz and Beach135 explain the reason to be that, in 
controversial issues, more voices make attempts to be heard, and the journalists 
try to provide information that covers the perspectives of each side of the issue. In 
confronting the situation, the community already knows that the conflict exists, 
and covering a wider range of sources may draw in a greater readership as well.136 
However, parties with interests in the conflicts may actively seek to direct 
media contents about the conflict. There are examples of official sources, such as 
the military, of trying to employ censorship or trying to restrict information flows. 
One of the examples is the First Gulf war in 1991, when the US government 
implemented press pools to manage information flow.137  
When they have few resources to access alternative news sources or lack 
access to conflict areas, news media rely on news agencies as their sources of 
news. Uwazuruike describes how in the 9/11 attack and Afghan war most of the 
images were from the main Western news agencies AFP, AP and Reuters. The 
news agencies also have an influence on shaping the news contents and the media 
agenda.138 
In his doctoral dissertation Uwazuruike analysed the sourcing patterns in the 
Nigerian news about Boko Haram and how the Nigerian press reported terrorism 
within its national borders.139 He focused on three perspectives: the news framing 
of Boko Haram, the sourcing patterns in the news reporting, and the challenges 
Nigerian journalists were facing in reporting Boko Haram. He noted that ethnicity, 
regionalism, and religious affiliations were significant determinants in the 
reporting and that the journalists legitimized violence against Boko Haram and 
failed to promote or explore non-violent approaches. His study also showed that 
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newspapers preferred official sources like the security forces and that the religious 
sources were given priority depending on the ethnoreligious leanings of the 
editors.140 
News framing reveals some aspects of the reality to the public, such as the 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluations, and the 
recommendations for the described topics. In case of terrorism, relevant actors try 
to promote their interpretations about the events on the local media level, but also 
in the international media. The international media’s relevance is its influence on 
how the foreign public and governments perceive the conflict. However, there is 
still the difficulty of cultural interpretations; how the messages resonate in 
different cultures. The media also determines the news frames with the language it 
selects to describe the events, for example, term selections like lynching, 
murdering, assassinating, or killing. Other means of framing are the selection of 
images the choice of experts and authority commentators, and the varying 
interpretations of the opposing parties. Uwazuruike notes that the frames mostly 
reflect, or are likely to be determined from a cultural context.141 
The cultural context can also have an impact on the reporting from a certain 
viewpoint, like that of the victim, or from the “defensive mode”. The victim’s 
mode is more likely to be the case when the event concerns one’s own people, like 
civilian casualties. The defensive mode reporting takes place when the authorities 
are rationalizing their actions, usually when there are civilian deaths on the other 
side. In the victim’s mode reporting two types of framing are common: ethnic 
solidarity stories and the ones that demonize the enemy. In addition to these, 
Uwazuruike mentions patriotism to be one underlying theme in these stories.142 
Uwazuruike studied the themes and framing patterns of reporting in the 
Chibok girls’ case in two Nigerian newspapers, the Daily Trust and the Vanguard. 
He discovered three dominant news frames that were used in the texts: 1) Mass 
abduction, 2) Government inaction and 3) Terrorism. In his study most of the 
news represented the mass abduction frame, however, Boko Haram was not 
usually referred to as a terrorist group nor linked to Islam, but simply as Boko 
Haram. The news also mirrored the polarization of North vs. South in the country. 
Within the mass abduction frame the northern based Daily Trust presented Boko 
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Haram as a group that can be negotiated with and the mainly southern based 
newspaper Vanguard, again, presented the group as terrorists or Islamic 
fundamentalists. 
The study also showed how ethnic consideration was a major determinant in 
the uses of the frames in the reporting about the Chibok girls’ abduction. In this 
sense the reporting also reflects the ethno-religious tensions and crises in the 
country: on one hand the suspicion against the southern based federal government 
and on the other hand “demonization of the northern elders and Islamic leaders”. 
Uwazuruike writes that “instead of a common enemy, Boko Haram, against the 
Nigerian people, as often is the case in Western terrorism reportage, there is a 
complex web of “enemies” depending what side of the fence one sits”. The 
conflict is not a binary division of government versus Boko Haram, but instead 
between the southern Christian religious leaders, northern elites, state and federal 
government officials, and Boko Haram. Correspondingly, all the parties try to 
shape the news narratives. Uwazuruike also notes that there is “also a negative 
representation of Muslims as terrorists or friends of terrorists, consistent with 
established frames in the West associating Islam with terrorism. The study also 
revealed that the two news medias, Daily Trust and Vanguard, in their reporting 
relied mostly on official government sources.143 
In general, reporting about events in Africa has been indicated to be biased 
in the Western media. The continent – which has a richness of diverse cultures – 
is often portrayed negatively as a continent of acute famine and severe starvation 
and with attributes like tribal anarchy, civil war, political instability, flagrant 
corruption, and incompetent leadership. Despite efforts to recognize the 
imbalance, most stories about Africa in the international media are still told by 
foreign journalists.144 However, the Western perspective of reporting terrorism 
may not be directly applicable to the African context either.145  
Western media usually has another bias in associating any act of terrorism 
with Islam or Muslims. For example, in a study about framing Boko Haram in 
various reports of BBC and Al-Jazeera it was found out that BBC’s framing of 
Boko Haram’s insurgency took stereotypic dimensions of associating Islam with 
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barbarism, suicide bombings, extremism and terrorism. When Western media 
reports about non-Muslim terrorists, media seems to be quiet about the religion.146 
In the mainstream Western secularism (value liberalism) reporting religion-
related topics also reflects the Western values. The more near the phenomenon is 
to the media’s own values, the more auspiciously the media relates to it and, 
correspondingly, the phenomenon being far, the more dismissive the attitude.147 
3.2 Newsworthiness 
In addition to framing, the news value theory, or newsworthiness, gives 
perspective in understanding the media contents and the journalistic process. The 
original theory of  “newsworthiness”, as the authors named it, was originally 
presented by Galtung and Ruge in 1965.148 In their study they identify 12 factors 
that determine the newsworthiness of an event: threshold, frequency, 
unexpectedness, unambiguity, relevance, consonance, continuity, composition, 
reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to persons, and 
negativity.149 They stated that an event does not have to meet all the criteria to 
become news, but the more of the criteria are met, the more likely it is the event 
will be reported and regarded as news by the audience.  
Harcup and O’Neill further elaborated the news criteria theory with some 
new findings. They included the power elite and celebrities, entertainment, and 
follow-up to the new criteria.150  
News value theory offers a viable tool in understanding the news media’s 
interest in violent extremism. The activities that the violent extremists engage in 
also comply with many of the news value criteria. According to Galtung and 
Ruge, the more negative the event and its consequences, the more probable it is it 
becomes news.151 Kidnapping schoolgirls, recruiting suicide bombers or bombing 
schools, churches and mosques are deeply negative acts that have far-reaching 
consequences and are, as such, newsworthy for the media. Although the events of 
extreme violence bring up the perspective of journalistic ethics, they also include 
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elements like unexpectedness and human drama that the news media need in 
attracting and keeping its audiences.152 
Abdukari has studied the newsworthiness and ethical dilemmas of terror 
reporting. He notes that journalists considered Boko Haram stories to be highly 
newsworthy with impelling news criteria factors like conflict, negativity, 
unusualness, drama, impact and topicality. In reporting the insurgency, the 
journalists also constantly contended with ethical dilemmas like making decisions 
on what to report or not to report, content selection, story framing, choice of 
terms, dealing with attack victims, relating with the sources and safeguarding 
personal safety and professional sustainability. Those who had had direct 
encounters with the extremists in the northeastern region of Nigeria got more 
newsworthy stories, but also faced more ethical challenges than those journalists 
who covered the news of crises from relatively safer places. The journalists also 
faced dilemmas like if the stories could help Boko Haram’s propaganda efforts 
and, if not reporting or underreporting the event, if it would harm the journalists’ 
duty of telling the truth and informing the public.153 
3.3 Foreign news transmission 
The several studies about foreign news reveal what kind of events the news 
producers perceive as newsworthy and what events are selected as international 
news. In these studies, the focus has been on the comparison of the local and 
global emphasis of the news contents and on finding out why the objects and 
subjects of the news are very similar in various countries. Foreign news seems to 
affect the perception that the audience of the media has about other countries and 
cultures. This is partly because the news themselves are perceived as an objective 
description of the reality.154 
The quantity of foreign news in the Finnish media has been subject to 
research for decades. In 1961 a study155 revealed that the foreign news in 16 
Finnish newspapers were largely Western-oriented with European news covering 
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about two thirds of the news. The share of developing countries was 15%. The 
news media received the news mostly from news agencies, either directly or via 
the Finnish News Agency STT. In a later study (1975) the same trend continued 
and the news about developing countries were mostly negative.156 There are 
studies with the conclusion that the news about third world countries concentrate 
on crises, are one-sided and avoid dealing with details or complex phenomena.157  
The same trend continued also in an international study on foreign news in 
1995. In this study the most important news topics in each country were those of 
the same continent, and after that news from Western Europe and the United 
States.158 Twelve years later in 2007 a study focusing on the foreign news in 
Finnish media showed that Western and Northern countries - like in the earlier 
studies as well - were over-represented, and this bias was also explained by the 
economic inequality.159  
These studies concentrating in news flows have revealed the importance of 
news agencies in news production and distribution. A historical explanation for 
the Western focus of the news is the still slightly existing heritage of colonialism 
that has caused the news to flow from the Western countries to the South, and the 
historical Western worldview with centres and peripheries.160 Another well-known 
bias is that the international news agencies have been concentrated in the 
economic centres of the world, like London and New York. These elite countries 
appear more prominently in the news due to the routinization of journalistic 
processes, which emphasize institutions like authorities and politicians as news 
sources, and typical events like elections, state visits, catastrophes, and 
takeovers.161 
One factor also affecting news production is cultural nearness. Cultural 
nearness refers to historical and cultural bonds as well as economic and political 
alliances. This kind of interaction is quite stable and unchanging in its nature. 
When an event is linked to one’s own culture, it is more likely to become 
newsworthy. Also, foreign correspondents are more easily situated in countries 
that are geographically, politically, economically and culturally closer.162 
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International news agencies have been transmitting news from the mid 19th 
century and they have an important role in the globalization development as well. 
The four biggest news agencies are Reuters in Britain, Agence France Press (AFP) 
in France and Associated Press (AP) and Bloomberg in the USA. In addition to 
being global news agencies they also have a role as the news agencies of their 
respective countries. This also may have an impact on the emphasis of news 
concentrating on elite countries.163  
There has been a long discussion about the crises of the newspaper sector. 
While the circulation rates and number of readers of newspapers have dropped 
and caused declining revenues, online news content creators are recycling original 
news content without paying for it. Consequently, many newspapers have closed 
down and employment for journalists has plummeted. For example, in Europe the 
circulation rate of daily print newspapers has decreased by 21.3% between 2010 
and 2015. In the same period in the US the number of employees has decreased by 
39%. At the same time journalists are expected to produce much more output than 
in the earlier decades. Lacking time and resources, journalists are under pressure 
to use public relations materials and news agency contents for their output. This 
development has raised concern about diversity and increasing homogenization in 
the news as well as accuracy and trustworthiness.164 
In the Finnish media landscape the trend has been the same; the leading 
media houses have reduced their resources in foreign news production. Finnish 
media has traditionally relied much on foreign news sources for international 
news.165  
3.4 The relation of media and terrorism 
On September 11, 2001 when the World Trade Center and Pentagon were 
attacked, the relation between terrorism and media was transformed.166 Almost all 
the media in the U.S. and worldwide were filled with live video of two airplanes 
crashing into two of New York’s most well-known skyscrapers, the twin towers 
of the World Trade Center.167 The event formed a kind of collective trauma, where 
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also journalists in the news media were as confused about what had happened as 
their audience. The attack also realigned the media’s priorities and, in addition to 
various forms of cooperation, the media houses also shared their continuous 
contents about the catastrophe with each other.168 The case was studied from many 
perspectives, like its impact on journalism.169  
Lipschulz170 writes that historically terrorism has been related to the concept 
of propaganda. Although terrorism had been reported about in the media earlier, 
Lipschulz states that before the 9/11 attacks, U.S. news media lacked a language 
for terrorism. Zelizer and Allan171 refer to the same saying that there was not a 
readymade “script” or frame in telling the seemingly incomprehensible story to 
their audiences.172  
Ten days after the attack president George W. Bush announced a global war 
on terrorism. The news media worldwide started using the phrase “war on terror”. 
This expression legitimized the phenomenon of “terror” which although not a 
state is something against which a state can wage a war.173 Ever since, this 
expression has given a frame to addressing terrorism in the media and news media 
has used it widely in its narratives.174 It also became the standard in understanding 
“friends” and “enemies” of the U.S. and offered politicians and journalists in the 
U.S. a narrative to make sense of the diverse stories about international security, 
civil war and global conflict. In this sense this “war on terrorism” frame also 
became a political tool.175 
According to Freedman and Daya176 the term “war on terror” has had an 
Islamic connotation, but the view of Islamic militancy is undifferentiated and the 
Islamist groups, like al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and other radical Islamist groups in different parts of 
the world are too often presented as part of a seamless transnational terror network 
in the mainstream media. They also note that the majority of the world’s Muslims 
have nothing to do with terrorism. On the contrary, they are victims of this 
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“scourge” and the “war on terror” has brought misery to large parts of Islamic 
world. 
In his article Lipschulz studies the framing of terrorism in news media. He 
writes that “the gatekeeping process of news, including news of terrorism, is a 
strange mix of news values, available sources, political concerns, nationalistic 
tendencies, economic realities, and cultural norms of interpretation”. However, 
studying words only is limited and we need to better understand the visual 
importance and the imagery of television news stories”.177 
Journalism is easily seen as objective description of reality. McGoldrick in 
her article elaborates the biases in war reporting. She notes that there are three 
biases in conventional conflict reporting; 1) a bias in favour of official sources, 2) 
a bias in favour of event over process and, 3) a bias in favour of dualism in 
reporting conflicts. She writes that a news story is supposed to answer six basic 
questions: who, what, when, where, why and how. Of these questions “why” is 
dealt with only superficially in most of the news, partly because the journalists 
may think it would make the news too long. However, explaining the causes 
would help make sense of the events.178 
In reporting conflicts media coverage is characterized to have weaknesses, 
like simplifying the causes of conflicts, focusing on male actors, portraying 
women as victims and focusing on extraordinary violence and its visible effects.179 
Media also easily depicts the acts as a chain of events from the perspective 
of a third person, which makes us easily forget the moral perspectives of the acts. 
When the events are seen like flows of acts, one following another, the 
perspective of responsibility of the action is also blurred.180 
In the Western world, media draws the pictures of the victims of terrorism, 
and at the same, gives publicity to human suffering. The audience’s role is to 
respond with compassion to the emotional engagement that media offers in 
describing the victims of conflicts. A concept of “global compassion” refers to the 
affective and cognitive reaction to human suffering of distant others in the public 
sphere. According to Birgitta Höijer this concept is situated in the intersection 
between politics, humanitarian organization, the media and the citizens. Human 
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suffering is also part of Western politics in the form of humanitarian aid 
concerning distant global crises and wars.181 
There have been many studies about the relation between media and 
terrorism and the studies reveal that the relationship is beneficial for both parties. 
The news media seems to have a complex relation with extreme terrorism. Violent 
extremism supplies the media with many of the key elements of news value 
(newsworthiness) theory: negativity, controversy, unusualness, conflict, 
sensationalism and impact.182 Terrorists want attention for their attacks and the 
media benefits from the attacks as an increase in sales and audience’s eagerness to 
get information about the terrorist attacks.183 
Uwazuruike describes the relation to be symbiotic: the relevant actors in 
conflicts cannot ignore the media and the media cannot ignore the conflicts. He 
writes that most of the definitions of terrorism emphasize the media’s role as if 
“an act is only indeed terrorism if it can attract the attention of the media”. He also 
refers to Hoskins and O’Loughlin who argue that the media not only moderates 
the public understanding and perception of terrorism, but also its public 
appearance.184 What the public knows about conflicts, it knows it from the reports 
in the media, and due to this, the major actors of the conflict contest to influence 
the media agenda and via it, the public agenda.185 
On the other hand, the media also legitimizes the uses of military responses 
and violence against the terrorists by drawing a picture of terrorists as an 
uncivilized evil and enemies.186 
However, seeing terrorism as seeking publicity is simplistic because it 
ignores that terrorists are making efforts to direct news coverage to advance their 
cause in good light (from their perspective) and targeting to evoke fear, attract 
new members, polarize public opinion, and gain a certain image with their 
communication. In this sense the violent acts of terrorism differ from other acts of 
violence; they are communicatively constituting and intending to transmit 
messages of fear.187  
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Terrorist organizations like Boko Haram are skilful in using traditional and 
social media to advance their objectives, to spread their ideology and, for 
example, to intimidate their enemies and recruit new people. They also have their 
own media and communications strategies, based on understanding the agenda-
setting function of media and its skilful deployment. Boko Haram has also 
received wide media coverage in its native Nigeria focusing on the group’s violent 
attacks and the government’s reaction. The group also has murdered journalists 
and bombed newspaper premises.188  
Reporting terrorism requires tough ethical evaluations from the journalists. 
The reporters have to face the threat of extreme violence, like beheadings of their 
colleagues, or the abduction or exploitation of innocent, defenceless children. They 
also must decide to which extent they report the events. Trying to report the events 
as cruel as they occur may on one hand serve the terrorists’ aim in creating fear and 
manipulating the audiences with their propaganda. On the other hand, 
underreporting may create a false feeling of security but also be against journalism’s 
basic principles of telling the truth and, as such, increase distrust in the news 
media.189 
The reporting may also be biased. Ezeah and Emmanuel190 refer to studies 
about “parachute journalism” where journalists are dispatched from their offices 
to the scenes of conflict areas immediately when there has been a crisis. They say 
that the danger in this kind of reporting is that reporters may not have an adequate 
knowledge of the people or the contexts. This may lead to misunderstanding the 
crises and thus, misreporting.191 
Ezeah and Emmanuel192 in their study about the media publicity of Boko 
Haram describe how the group started as a domestic militant group and gained 
larger international publicity after the bombing attack in August 2011 against the 
United Nations office in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital.193 Before that Boko Haram was 
considered as an al-Qaeda affiliate group and as such, not a potential threat to 
United States. As Ezeah and Emanuel state, this interpretation suggests that foreign 
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media in Western countries becomes interested in international events only if they 
have domestic implications.194 
Nigerian journalist Adaobi Nwaubani has studied how Boko Haram’s 
former leader Abubakar Shekau manipulated media. She describes: 
Prior to the Chibok kidnappings, Shekau was just some madman Nigerians saw on TV 
once in a while. Bushy beard, combat clothes, he would stab at the camera with his 
fingers and guffaw wildly while swaying from side to side, surrounded by armed men 
in balaclavas… When Shekau expressed his desire to eradicate Western education and 
impose Islamic education and law in Nigeria, many of us laughed. Who did this maniac 
from the hinterlands of our country really think he was? 195 
After the Chibok kidnappings Boko Haram has provided the media with 
provocative videos. Nwaubani states that the Chibok girls case offered the media a 
lens of gender violence that Boko Haram used in building their global brand. 
Later Boko Haram has started to use female bombers in suicide attacks. 
According to Nwaubani’s	report	this	also	indicates	Boko	Haram’s	eagerness	
to	grab	international	media	headlines.196 
Uwazuruike describes how Boko Haram has intentions to profile its attacks 
as strategic and how it also tries to attract international attention. The group sends 
its videos to AFP (Agence France-Presse) that gathers and transmits news reports 
worldwide. Uwazuruike describes how the group’s wider need for audiences are 
reached by more traditional means like radio, but through YouTube and 
“preferred local journalists” as well.197 
The media sphere in Nigeria has long and wide roots in the colonial history 
of the country. British media still has a strong heritage in the country and like the 
former BBC correspondent in Africa Martin Plaut writes, the BBC has “a huge 
and loyal audience across the continent, which has been built up over decades”. 
BBC provides radio programmes in many languages including English, Arabic, 
Hausa, Swahili, French and Portuguese. BBC World Services covers an audience 
of 111 million people in Africa across all platforms, including television and 
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online platforms. Plaut writes that the number includes 56 million television 
watchers, 76 million radio listeners and 6 million Internet users.198 Ezeah and 
Emmanuel describe the presence of BBC Hausa services as dominant and “huge” 
especially in Northern Nigeria, with a weekly reach of 23.5 million adults, and 
being four times the size of the audience of BBC’s English services in Nigeria.199  
However, the media in Nigeria also reflect the same polarization between 
North and South as does the religious landscape. The people in the South are more 
educated, the literacy rate is higher and most of the news organisations are based 
in the South or owned by southern people. In the predominantly Southwest 
Nigerian press Muslims are more likely to be portrayed in a negative light.200 
  
 
198 Plaut 2017. 
199 Ezeah & Emmanuel 2016. 
200 Uwazuruike 2018b, 31, 56. 
40 
  
4 Terrorism and its consequences 
This chapter focuses, in addition to describing terrorism in general, also on the 
perspective of the victims of violence and the gender-based sexual violence in 
conflicts. In the Chibok schoolgirls’ case one perspective is the abduction, which 
is also elaborated.  
4.1 What is terrorism? 
How can terrorism be defined? Terrorism is a controversial term, but one of its 
characteristics is that it always involves violence or a threat of violence.201 In their 
article Esther Akinsola and Adebusola Ojo note that terrorism is a global 
phenomenon that has no officially agreed upon definition and the definition 
depends on the perspective from which it is defined. It may be perceived as a 
reaction to injustice or oppression or, from the legal perspective, as a crime 
against the state and humanity. It also affects society in many ways.202  
Various studies are concentrating on the definitions of terrorism. Schmid 
and Jongman analyzed 109 different definitions of terrorism in 1988 and later 
Weinberg and colleagues examined 73 definitions in 55 articles in 2004. Both 
studies underlined the central role of media in public understanding and 
perception of terrorism. Relying on this perception, publicity seems central to 
terrorism strategies and the primary objective of it is to make an impact on 
political elites, the public, or both.203  
One perspective to define terrorism is the criteria used by the Global 
Terrorism Database in defining a terrorist attack:  
“The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal 
through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”204 
To be included in the database, three attributes must be present in an 
incident: 1) The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation 
on the part of a perpetrator, 2) The incident must entail some level of violence or 
immediate threat of violence including property violence, as well as violence 
against people and, 3) The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national 
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actors. There are other criteria as well, one being that the incident has to be outside 
the context of legitimate warfare activities and by that, also outside the parameters 
permitted by international humanitarian law.205 
Philip E. Devine and Robert J. Rafalko define terrorism as “violence 
directed, as a matter of political strategy, against innocent people.”206 They point 
out that the element of political strategy distinguishes terrorism from warfare and 
ordinary crime. Terrorists attempt to use constant fear as a means of political 
power to gain attention to themselves or their grievances. However, in the context 
of a civil war the distinction between crime, military violence and terrorism is not 
that clear. A wartime atrocity in the international context may be an act of 
terrorism in the civil context.207 According to the writers the most essential 
difference between terrorism and civil disobedience is that terrorism uses violence 
to achieve its goals.  
Devie and Rafalko also note that in the political strategies of terrorism one 
element is the incoherence of terrorists’ aims, which are often ill-defined and 
without a clear idea how to gain political power.208 This has been seen in the life-
span of Boko Haram as well. 
The actions of Boko Haram have been defined to be both war and terrorism. 
The definition of the group seems not to be unambiguous, and it varies depending 
on the sources as well. For example, Amnesty International uses the definition 
“Islamist insurgent movement”.209 Boko Haram itself defines its operations to be 
religious war (jihad), but the state leaders of Nigeria have unanimously defined 
the actions to not to be religious, but a war against all the Nigerian people.210 In 
May 2014, Nigeria and other West African countries declared a full-scale 
operation against Boko Haram. Concurrently, Nigeria’s former president 
Goodluck Jonathan declared that he is determined “to protect our democracy, our 
national unity and our political stability, by waging a total war against 
terrorism.”211 
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4.2 Victims of terrorism 
Since the World Trade centre attack on 9.11.2001 in New York, there have been 
many studies concentrating on terrorism and its consequences from different 
viewpoints. There are some significant features of all terroristic attacks: 
The primary objective of the terrorists is to induce communal fear. 
Those individuals who are targeted are used as means to produce communal disruption 
and anxiety. 
The whole community suffers from the result of the terroristic attacks, including those 
who are not directly injured or witnessing the attack. 
Terroristic attacks usually occur without a warning. This makes them psychologically 
more damaging, because people are not prepared to them.212 
WHO defines collective violence as “the instrumental use of violence by 
people who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is 
transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another group or set of 
individuals, to achieve political, economic or social objectives”.213 
Victimhood can also be collective when it is a result of experiences of being 
targeted as a group. It refers to the psychological experience and consequences of 
harm or injury. These kinds of consequences may cause victimization-related 
cognitions and behaviour, shape the group’s collective identity, and have an 
impact on the group’s interaction with other groups. Collective victimization may 
be due to structural violence, like inequality caused by discriminatory societal 
structures and practices that can be seen in education, employment, or healthcare. 
It may also be a result of direct violence, like ethnic conflict, terrorism, hate 
crimes, war, and genocide.214  
Collective victimization has many dimensions that may have an impact on 
how victimhood is distinguished. One dimension is the temporality, if the event 
has been a one-time event or if it has been sustained over a long period of time. 
The other dimension is the symmetry, meaning how much power the victim group 
has compared to the perpetrators.215  
In the case of Chibok girls, the asymmetry is obvious in many ways: under-
aged schoolgirls versus armed terrorist men or the government politics. As under-
aged children, the Chibok schoolgirls also represent the “innocent vulnerability” 
which is an instrument to mobilize tender-heartedness and parental love. This kind 
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213 WHO 2002, 115. 
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of depiction of children in a conflict may shift the narratives in news media from 
crises to sentimental pity. In the studies about refugee children this kind of child 
imagery has led to infantilizing refugee children and depicting them as 
predominantly distressed, clueless and powerless. It may raise empathy in the 
name of “our” common humanity, but it also deprives the children of agency and 
voice.216 This kind of critique has been attached to the #BringBackOurGirls 
campaign as well, although the public reactions can be seen to be signs of 
compassion and emotional engagement.217 
Collective victimization affects the group in multiple ways. In the case of 
direct violence, it causes physical dimensions of suffering, such as injuries and 
deaths and, in the case of structural violence the consequences may be seen in 
mental well-being, life expectancy and quality of life. It also has the material 
dimension in the case of destruction and loss of property, and cultural dimensions, 
like its impact on the worldview, way of life, cultural continuity, language, norms 
and values. All these dimensions may leave the group with a sense of trauma or 
distress and harm the group member’s psychological well-being. The impact of 
collective victimizations also extends to the group members who did not directly 
experience the harmful event itself, but who identify themselves with the victim 
group. Collective victimhood can also be transmitted historically through family 
narratives.218  
In disaster studies the victims are classified into three categories: Direct 
victims: those who are physically present or in close proximity to an event; 
secondary victims: family members, close friends of victims and professionals 
like emergency personnel who assist in events and; indirect victims: individuals in 
the community affected by the secondary effects.219 All these categories are 
present in the Chibok schoolgirl case as well. However, in addition to being 
victims some of the abducted girls are also subjects of terroristic acts, like suicide 
bombings and reported killings. 
The girls and women are victims of war and terrorism from many 
perspectives. One explanation is the gendering of conflicts: the gender determines 
 
216 Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017, 1168–1169. 
217 Höijer 2004, 526 writes that sometimes female viewers identify with the situation of the 
victims. This kind of reaction may be due to cultural and traditional reasons and women’s mainly 
caring roles in family life, where women are fostered to show more feelings. Showing the feelings 
of solidarity with victims may not accord with male ideals about heroic warfare and violence. 
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219 Costin 2006, 234. 
44 
  
who participates in conflicts and what kind of roles they play. The role of fighters 
and soldiers has traditionally been assigned to men and they, therefore, have been 
given the role of defending territory, women and children. Gender also has played 
a role in conflicts in the form of sexual violence targeted disproportionally at 
women and girls.220  
In the context of conflicts women are easily portrayed as victims in the 
media.221 Höijer writes that the audience accepts the dominant victim code of the 
media and regards children, women and the elderly as ideal victims that deserve 
compassion.222 
On the other hand, stereotyping is not only related to the images of victims. 
The image of a terrorist is mainly a fanatical male and female terrorists like the 
suicide bombers challenge this stereotype. Uwazuruike refers to studies223 where it 
has been argued that there is no evidence that male and female terrorists would 
fundamentally differ from each other in terms of recruitment, motivation, 
ideological factors, or for example brutality. However, in the news media female 
terrorists are likely to be described by their appearance, family status, biological 
details, and social circumstances, and the focus on the personal aspects attributes 
the female terrorist’s behaviour to merely external factors rather than to personal 
motivation. 224 
Sexual violence including child abuse and sexual exploitation in wars and 
conflicts has been reported extensively. Conflicts may also force the people to 
displace, and they may suffer from breakdowns of families and lack of social 
protective structures. Especially refugees and internally displaced persons are in a 
highly vulnerable position with regard to sexual violence during displacements or 
conflicts.225 
Boko Haram actively uses sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a 
strategic tactic in its operations. Women and girls are also used as instruments in 
violent operations, for example, in brutal suicide bombings. As in the Boko 
 
220 Medie 2017, 22. As in the case of Boko Haram, women and girls also have played a variety of 
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Haram case, the conflict can affect increased rates of child and early marriages 
when the girls and women have no or little choice to marry potentially violent 
partners.226 Almost half of the girls aged 15–18 have in Northern Nigeria have 
begun childbearing. Because of systematic rape, the United Nations Population 
Fund has helped with deliveries of 16,000 babies in the Boko Haram ravaged 
Northeastern Nigeria only during the years 2014–2015. However, there are also 
pregnancies due to romantic relationships and forced marriages.227 
The female victims are also creators of a new generation of children.228 
These children may suffer from a range of emotional and behavioural 
disturbances, which may have an impact on perpetrating or experiencing violence 
later in life.229 In the case of Boko Haram both the women and their children have 
been reported to suffer from stigmatization which may have a wider impact on 
their chances to recover or reconnect and participate in the community.230 
In general, terrorism is armed attacks against the defenceless that destroy 
unexpectedly and without provocation the peace outside warzones. As Campbell 
writes in her article, for the terrorists the victims are only an instrument, not the 
ultimate target. Besides, the whole community is affected by terrorism.231 
Because the nature of terroristic events is unpredictable, there exists neither 
much research evidence on its impact nor the necessary psychosocial aid for 
adults and children. Therefore, many guidelines of aid rely on the combination of 
expert views and restricted evidence, and on the health services for the victims of 
the attacks, and they concentrate, partly artificially, on the time phases of recovery 
after the attack.232 
When talking about the victims of terrorism it is also essential to define the 
distinction between an on-going conflict and isolated, single acts of terrorism. 
Psychological reactions to on-going conflicts may be compared to those of 
warfare.233 
In psychology a common viewpoint of research have been the psychological 
effects or consequences of terrorism like the psychological well-being in the form 
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of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which can be expected as a normal 
reaction to a highly traumatic event. It has also been researched that most of the 
victims of terrorism suffer from psychological distress in the immediate aftermath 
of the terrorist attack. The studies show that individual vulnerability for PTSD 
increases when factors like lower IQ and a low level of education, lower 
socioeconomic status, being female, and being from an ethnic minority are in 
question.234 
The bystanders, or indirect victims, form a very critical mass for a conflict. 
In violent cases bystanders may not have a choice at all. The collective conflicts 
may threaten basic human needs, like identity, security, human self-esteem, and 
the sense of justice. The ethnic group, the nation as well as the state serve as a 
vehicle to protect fundamental basic needs. 235 
Bystanders may even suffer from unhealed group trauma, especially when 
the group has met persecutions and violence. In these cases, it is more likely to 
respond to a threat with violence and revenge.236 
Staub defines bystanders to be “witnesses who are in a position to know 
about events” and describes: 
“They may close their eyes and ears to events and information and claim they did not 
know - hence we need the concept of being in a position to know. Passivity by internal 
bystanders (members of the population where the violence is occurring) and by external 
bystanders (outside groups and nations) encourages perpetrators. It allows the evolution 
of increasing violence. Such passivity is common.”237 
4.3 Abductions 
The Encyclopedia of Trauma238 defines the dynamics of abduction and kidnapping 
to be similar: the hostage-taker keeps someone against his will, and the victim 
becomes a pawn of negotiation or bargaining. Terrorists use abductions as a 
means of their political or economic interests as well as a statement of their power 
or propaganda. Kidnapping results in trauma not only to the victims but also to 
their families, friends, and the persons first involved. Because the victims do not 
necessarily know the aims of the kidnapper, whether there will be a release, abuse, 
harm, or killing, the range of emotions is wide from fear to anger and rage and 
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even guilt. The reactions may also be cognitive, like impaired memory and 
concentration, flashbacks, and denial that the event never happened.239 
In the case of a child survivor of many years of kidnapping, reconnection to 
society takes much time and requires many years of continued psychological 
support and counselling. In a study of abducted children, it was found out that 
they had symptoms from nightmares, fear of doors and windows to depression 
and problems at school and with peers. One result of kidnapping may be the so-
called Stockholm syndrome, where the victim develops a bond with or becomes 
sympathetic to the abductor. This has been reported in various studies about the 
abductions of adults as well with the notion that those who had more humiliating 
experiences also had an increased likelihood of experiencing the Stockholm 
syndrome.240 
In the recovery from an abduction the first means of aid are psychological 
first aid and critical incident management. Trust also plays a significant role: it 
must be regained for the victim. Both the victims and their families need 
counselling to regain control of normal life.241 
In Africa, Nigeria is not the only country where large-scale abductions have 
taken place. For example, in Uganda the Lord’s Resistance Army has abducted, 
raped, tortured, and killed a large number of people, including women and girls. It 
is estimated that between 1986 and 2006 the LRA abducted from 25,000 to 
38,000 children of whom about 7,500 were girls. Of them, some 1,000 became 
mothers during their captivity. Most of the abducted children were taken from 
their homes and forced to live with the LRA fighters and fight in their forces. 
They also had to commit atrocities towards their own families during their 
captivity. Women and girls who were mainly abducted to serve as wives and 
mothers, also experienced sexual violence, forced marriages, and enforced 
pregnancies.242 
One of the first comprehensive reports about the abductions made by Boko 
Haram in Nigeria was made by Human Rights Watch in 2014.243 HRW 
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interviewed 30 persons who had been abducted by Boko Haram and 16 witnesses 
of the abductions. Among the interviewed were also 12 Chibok schoolgirls who 
had been able to escape from Boko Haram. Other women and girls were abducted 
from their homes and villages, from farm work, on their way to fetch water or 
when they attended school. In captivity they were forced to convert to Islam or 
otherwise subjected to physical and psychological abuse, forced labour, forced 
marriage with their capturers, and sexual abuse including rape.  
In the case of the abductions of both the LRA and Boko Haram, the rescued 
girls have faced stigmatization from their families and communities. Some were 
thrown out from their families after some time and, in the LRA case, some of the 
girls were also stigmatized because of the reinsertion package they got from 
reception centres. The reinsertion packages and assistance to mothers made their 
reintegration to the community more difficult.244 
4.4 Conflict-related gender-based violence 
The research of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence has 
concentrated much on the violence against women and girls. Philipp Schulz 
emphasizes that wartime sexual violence against men is committed more 
frequently than generally assumed, but academics as well as policy-makers have 
directed only marginal attention to research on it. Schulz refers to documentation 
of conflict-related sexual violence against men and boys in at least 50 
contemporary armed conflicts including Syria, Libya, and the former 
Yugoslavia.245 
In his article Schulz tries to remedy the gap by investigating sexual violence 
against men and boys during the two-decade long civil war in Northern Uganda 
1986–2006/2008. Both parties of the war, the rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the troops of the government of Uganda, were responsible for 
extensive human rights violations, like killings, torture, and sexual violence 
against civilian people. Among these crimes against men were also penetrative 
anal rapes. Schulz writes that within the heteronormative and patriarchal context 
this is considered to harm the gender hierarchy, depriving the manhood, power 
and status and by virtue of these, subordinating the men. 
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The Uganda case reinforced the notion that crimes of men-directed sexual 
violence were excluded from the official discourses of the conflict and, the male 
survivors’ lived realities remained silenced and this led the victims to suffer in 
isolation. Also, the public speaking about the victims’ experiences of sexual abuse 
may lead to shame and a social stigma. This challenges the way the sexual abuse 
of men is acknowledged in society. In the Uganda case, among the elements of 
reparations and remediation were material compensation like tools for agriculture 
that would help the men to recover their daily functional life and physical 
rehabilitation. The survivors wished “justice as a better future” to reinforce the 
gender identities and the relationships in the community.246  
According to Blunt247 there has been much criticism about war being 
presented as the sphere of masculinity and domesticity as the feminine sphere: 
while men fight their heroic battles, protecting mothers, sons and daughters at 
home, women provide a background, home, a kind of sphere of safety.		
Violating enemy women has been a part of war strategies and it has been 
done  - also systematically as ordered acts - through the ages.248 Seifert writes that 
for example mass rapes have occurred in all the modern wars, but they have 
gained worldwide attention only after the atrocities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
war at the beginning of the 1990s.249 In her article Seifert refers to articles about 
mass raping cases that have taken place in the 20th century.250	
The rapes in wars have cultural functions: they also destroy the physical and 
psychological existence of the victims and harm the collective identity and 
ethnicity of the whole group. Seifert continues that war crimes against women 
have a symbolic meaning, and in the contexts of war they are not a sexual but an 
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aggressive act. She states that sexual attacks on women must have a collective 
meaning: they are historical and social processes that are carried out collectively 
and they cannot be explained, for example, as biology-based genetic 
aggressiveness.251 
During the times of war women have been holding the families and 
communities together. Sexual violence against them is violence against the 
national – or ethnic - culture as well. Harming women’s emotional or physical 
well-being also aims at harming social and cultural stability, and the 
psychological effect of sexual violence may lead to the devaluation and 
dissolution of an entire group. In her article Seifert refers to the Serb strategy in 
the former Yugoslavia war. They first destroyed the cultural heritage, secondly 
captured and killed the intellectuals and thirdly established rape camps for 
women.252 
Raping the counterpart’s women in wars also harms the traditional idea of a 
family and at the same time, the idea of “safe havens” that the home and family 
represent to many who have been driven away from home.253  
Rape also is one form of torture, an act of hatred, which apart from the 
physical pain also constitutes an attack on a person’s identity, and loss of dignity 
and self-determination.254 Sexually tortured or raped women may suffer from loss 
of identity, anxiety, sleeping disorders, nightmares, apathy, as well as from 
depression or suicidal inclination.255   
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5 Framing the abduction of the Chibok girls 
In this chapter I apply the concepts of framing theory - sourcing, quoting and 
framing - to the selected Helsingin Sanomat (HS) news data. The data used in this 
study consists of a total of 105 news texts published in HS from April 2014 to 
December 2018. Of the news 96 were published in the foreign news section, 5 as 
editorials and the remaining 3 in other sections of the newspaper. The Culture and 
Sunday sections in HS feature special thematic articles. The Radio- tv section 
includes descriptions about upcoming programs. 
News categories by year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Culture 







Foreign news 57 20 16 1 3 97 
Radio-tv 1 
    
1 
Sunday 1 
    
1 
Grand Total 63 20 17 1 4 105 
Table 1. News types per year. 
5.1.1 Sourcing patterns 
The sources that are referred to in the texts reveal where the news contents came 
from. Because all the news articles are outcomes of a journalistic production 
process, I excluded the references to HS’s news and HS journalists from the 
source listing. 
The 105 news articles included 196 mentions to 41 different reference 
sources which were then categorized into nine source type categories. The main 
source type categories in this study were: 1) Boko Haram, 2) Finnish media, 3) 
Human rights organizations 4) Researchers, international journalists 5) News 
agency, 6) News media with an international audience,256 7) Nigerian authorities 
(government, security, army), 8) Nigerian news media,257 and 9) other. While each 
of the source types was only counted once per a news item, the total number of 
source types ended up to be 146. 
Table 2 shows the source types used in the news. News agencies were 
mentioned as sources in 79 of the news (75% of all the news). News medias with 
an international audience were referenced as sources in 29 of the news (28%). 
 
256 In this category the medias are: Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, International Business Times, NBC 
News, Nigeria's hidden war document, Sky News, The Guardian, The New York Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, Voice of America and The New York Times. 
257 This category consists of Nigerian media like Daily Post, Nigerian Tribune, Premium Times 
and general references to Nigerian newspapers and media. 
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Almost half of these, 13 in total, referred to the British Broadcasting Company 
BBC, which traditionally holds a strong presence in the African media space (see 
in more detail in Table 3). Only 5 of the news (5%) included direct references to 
Nigerian media. Other Finnish media was referred to as a source in only one of 
the news.  
News items and the used source 














% of all 
the news 
(105) 
News agencies 48 15 12 1 3 79 75 % 
News media with an international 
audience 
14 7 6 1 1 29 28 % 
Human rights organization 5 4 7 
  
16 15 % 




6 6 % 




5 5 % 
Researchers and research 
organizations 
1 4 
   
5 5 % 
Nigerian authorities 
(government, security, army) 
1 2 
   
3 3 % 
Others 2 
    
2 2 % 
Finnish media 1 
    
1 1 % 
Table 2. Individual news and the source types that were used. One news could contain references to several 
source types, but each source type was only counted once per a news item. 
As described earlier in this study, referring to other media sources may lead 
to a predefined - and as such simplified - interpretation of reality and the topic at 
hand.258 On the other hand, it also may be explained with news production 
challenges, like distance to the events and lack of access to sources or conflict 
areas or, with reduced media resources, especially in foreign news production. 
However, scarce references to Nigerian media, a local actor in the conflict area, 
cannot be explained by access because a lot of the contents were available online. 
Human rights organizations consist of Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch and UNICEF. The study made by the Finnish Church Aid and the 
Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers259 is also counted in this 
category. These organizations have published studies on the Boko Haram 
insurgency and its victims during the years 2014–2016. These were referred to as 
sources in16 news (15%). Individual researchers and research organizations who 
have studied Boko Haram were mentioned in 5 of the news (5%).260 
Boko Haram was mentioned as a source due to the videos the contents of 
which were referred in 2 news in 2014 and 4 news in 2016. The category “Others” 
included references to two persons; an individual Nigerian interviewee, and the 
 
258 Moy et al 2019. 
259 Botha & Abdile, 2016. 
260 These research organizations include Council of Foreign Relations Think Tank, Global 
Terrorism Index and Intel Center. 
 53 
former U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama. In the news data the individual 
interviewee seemed to be the only local Nigerian first-hand source, based on the 
journalist’s friendship. The approach of this news item was exceptional as well; a 
Nigerian middle-class interviewee described the causes of the conflict situation in 
her own country.261 Former U.S. First lady Michelle Obama in turn held a widely 
cited and internationally referred public speech about the fate of the Nigerian 
abducted schoolgirls.262 She also has been one of the international promoters in the 
#BringBackOurGirls worldwide campaign.  
The source type listing also revealed the dominant news agencies HS used 
in the news about Boko Haram (Table 3). Of the news agencies, AFP was 
mentioned as a source in 51 individual news (49% of total 105), Reuters in 40 
news (38%) and Finnish STT in 20 of the news (19%). AFP is the news agency 
Boko Haram has also used as the channel for the international delivery of its 
violent videos.263 Both Boko Haram and Amnesty International were mentioned as 
sources in 6 news (5%). 
The high number of references to news agencies and leading Western media 
actors is according to the earlier studies about foreign news sourcing patterns in 
Finnish media. According to these studies most of the foreign news items had 
been provided by the Western news agencies or via the Finnish News Agency 
STT.264 
Top six source mentions in 
news items 














 % of all 
the news 
(105)  
AFP (news agency) 34 7 8 
 
2 51 49% 
Reuters (news agency) 24 8 5 1 2 40 38% 
STT (news agency) 18 2 
   
20 19% 
BBC (News media with an 
international audience) 
6 3 3 1 
 
13 12% 
Boko Haram 2  4   6 5% 
Amnesty International 2 4    6 5% 
Table 3. The six most mentioned individual sources in the news. 
5.1.2 Quoting patterns 
The data used in this study consisted of 105 news from which I recognized a total 
of 458 direct or referred quotes. The quotes were sorted into seven quote type 
categories: 1) Nigerian authorities (State or local government, army, police 
forces), 2) Human rights or research organisation, researchers, experts, 3) Public 
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persons, activists, others, 4) Boko Haram, 5) Family, resident, school 
representative, witness 6) Foreign Government, and 7) Victim.265 The number of 
quotes was reduced to 211 by counting each of the quote types once per an 
individual news.  
Direct or referred quotes in the news 














% of all 
the news 
(105) 
Nigerian authorities (State or local 
government, army, police forces) 
40 12 12 1 4 69 66% 
Human rights or research organisation, 
researchers, experts 
13 9 12 
  
34 32% 
Public persons, activists, others 16 2 6 
 
1 25 24% 
Boko Haram 18 1 3 
  
22 21% 
Family, resident, school representative, 
witness 
14 2 3 
 
2 21 20% 
Foreign Government 19 2 
   
21 20% 
Victim 8 3 7 
 
1 19 18% 
Grand Total 128 31 43 1 8 211  
Table 4. Direct or referred quote source types in the news texts by year. In this table each quote type is 
counted only once per a news item. 
As Table 4 shows, most of the quotes in the news were from the official 
Nigerian authorities. The authorities were cited in 69 news, which represents 66% 
of the total amount of the news. This group consisted of Nigerian government 
representatives, including two presidents Goodluck Jonathan (in office May 6, 
2010 – May 29, 2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (in office from May 29, 2015 
onwards), army and police forces. Foreign government representatives were 
quoted in 21 of the news (20%). The high number of official representatives in the 
news is due to the notion that newspapers prefer official sources in global conflict 
reporting.266 
The second-largest group of quotes was that of the representatives of 
international human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, as well as researchers and experts who have studied Boko Haram. 
The representatives of this group were cited in 34 of the 105 news (32%). These 
citations were mostly related to the publications, documentation, or releases 
describing the violence of Boko Haram. The human rights organizations campaign 
globally against abuse and their citations in the news also represented the 
viewpoints of individual human suffering. 
 
265 These seven quote categories were quite much the same with the 15 categories Confidence 
Uwazuruike (2018) used in his study about the framing of Boko Haram in Nigerian media.  
266 Uwazuruike 2018b; McGoldrick 2006. 
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Boko Haram was cited in 22 of the news. These were mainly the citations of 
Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau speeches on Boko Haram’s videos.267 
Escaped or released victims of Boko Haram were cited in 19 of the news. 
However, only one of these citations was that of a released Chibok schoolgirl. 
Family members, residents of the villages, school representatives, and the 
eyewitnesses of Boko Haram’s other cruelties were cited in 21 of the news (20%).  
The group “Public persons, activists, others” refers to quotes of 
uncategorized individual sources like civil force representatives, former fighters 
of Boko Haram, intelligence sources, international observers and representatives 
of local peacebuilding organizations and activists fighting Boko Haram, as well as 
public persons like celebrities and politicians.  
5.1.3 Frame theme patterns 
In this study I categorized the news paragraphs into twelve frame theme 
categories that emerged from the contents of the news. The recognized frames 
refer to how the content was presented in the Helsingin Sanomat news; the 
selective aspect of how the events were written about and described. Most of the 
paragraphs represented only one theme, like the description of Nigerian 
background, but with some I had to consider the most appropriate theme category 
and decide into which category to put it. Due to this, the categorization may be 
subjective and some of the paragraphs could have fallen into another theme 
category as well. From the 105 news I was able to recognize a total of 434 frame 
themes. 
Like in the case of source and quoting patterns, I reduced the number of the 
references to thematic frames so that each of the recognized frames was only 
counted once per news. Due to this I refer to the number of the news, not to that of 
paragraphs. Each of the news may fall into several thematic categories. 
The recognized 12 frame themes were then grouped into four frame theme 
groups (see Table 5). The first group includes descriptions about the 
circumstances in Nigerian and the rise of Boko Haram. The second group, 
Government inactivity and politics, includes news about the government 
interventions and inactivity in dealing with the conflict and related interventions 
by both Nigerian and foreign governments and other parties. This category also 
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includes the contents that refer to politics and negotiation attempts to solve the 
situation, as well as to mistrust and false news. 
The third frame theme group, Terrorism and violence, is about the news that 
describe terrorism in its various forms, including the abductions of the Chibok 
schoolgirls and other attacks made by Boko Haram or other parties of the Nigerian 
conflict. The fourth group, Community and compassion, comprises of news 
describing the reactions of the community, mentions of escapes or releases, and 
the victims’ voices describing the experiences. Also, the frames describing 
international compassion, like the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, were counted 
in the sub-category of community reaction. 
Frame theme groups in the texts Theme present in no of news 
% of all the 
news (105) 
Understanding the circumstances  
Nigerian background 14 13 % 
Religious and ethnic diversity 9 9 % 
Boko Haram objectives or description 58 55 % 
Government inactivity and politics  
Government or security intervention or control 37 35 % 
False news and mistrust 30 29 % 
Politics, negotiations, international interventions 58 55 % 
Terrorism and violence   
The missing Chibok schoolgirls 78 74 % 
Terrorism, violence 35 33 % 
Other attacks 48 46 % 
Community and compassion   
Community reaction 33 31 % 
Escape or release 16 15 % 
Victim's perspective 18 17 % 
Total number of recognized frames in the news 434  
Table 5. Frame themes perceived in the news paragraphs. A frame theme was only counted once per a news 
item although it could have been recognized in several of its paragraphs. Also, multiple frame themes may 
have been perceived in a news item. 
In this part of the study I elaborate on each of the frame theme groups and 
their sub-categories with examples rising from the HS news data. 
5.2 Understanding the circumstances 
To understand Boko Haram one must understand the circumstances where the 
group’s insurgency has taken place. As discussed earlier, Finnish newspapers 
have been largely Western-oriented and the share of foreign news about 
developing countries is low. The news are mostly negative, concentrate on crisis, 
 57 
are one-sided, and avoid dealing with complex phenomena.268 The African 
continent is easily portrayed as unstable, underdeveloped and in conflict. News 
about African countries get coverage in the Western media when there is a big 
event, a pending catastrophe, or a disaster.269 For this, it was necessary to study 
how the Nigerian background was framed in the news data of this study. 
In this frame theme group I divided the background information into three 
sub-categories: the Nigerian background, Religious and ethnic diversity, and 
Boko Haram’s objectives and description. The Nigerian background in general 
was described in 14 of the news (13%). Religious diversity or discussion about the 
religious situation in the country is present only in nine of the news (9%). Boko 
Haram’s objectives and description of their activities were described in more than 
half of the news (58 news, 55%). 
5.2.1 Nigerian background 
Of the 105 news 14 included a description of the Nigerian background and basic 
information about the country. Descriptions in the texts mostly concentrated on 
the dichotomy of the country, on one hand on the division into the poor and rural 
North with conditions like a state of emergency and into the richer South with 
good infrastructure and, on the other hand on the division into the Christian South 
and the Muslim North. The dichotomy was present in the HS editorials as well.270 
Further tensions are caused by the fact that Muslims in Northern Nigeria and Christians 
in southern Nigeria have never found a common tone in an arbitrarily assembled state. 
The country lacks a common history. (N6)271 
The North is extremely poor, the South less poor. The country of 170 million people 
still has enormous natural resources such as oil. Earlier this year, Nigeria overtook 
South Africa and became Africa’s largest economy. 
At the same time, the northern parts of the country are living in conditions resembling 
civil war. Three states in the North - Borno, Yobe and Adamawa - have had a state of 
emergency since May last year due to the terror of Boko Haram. (N15) 272 
Nigeria’s long colonial history under British rule was mentioned only in 
passing in four of the news in the context of the school system of Western 
missionaries, urban and developed Southern Nigeria, and country borders that 
date back to the colonial time in Africa.273 
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The threat of Boko Haram’s attacks caused the postponing of Nigeria’s 
presidential elections in 2015, and this topic was discussed in many of the news. 
Nigerian democracy, in turn, was referred to in the statements of Boko Haram, but 
the realization of it was not discussed more widely. One of the news items 
highlighted the military forces’ growing influence on politics, and made a 
democracy-related notion about the journalists’ restricted access to country.274 One 
news dealt with a study of the former Boko Haram fighters and their faith in 
influencing through the democracy. 
The sect wants to re-establish the pre-colonial Islamic state to Northern Nigeria. The 
group’s charismatic leader, Muhammed Jusuf, driving a Mercedes-Benz, has a group of 
converted followers from the impoverished of the North, who are violently opposed to 
westernization, democracy and the modern education system. (15)275 
Now the concern is once again the growing influence of the armed forces in politics. 
The nervousness of the security apparatus is also reflected in the fact that Nigeria has 
denied visas to dozens of foreign journalists (N84)276 
Although Boko Haram is fighting with arms, at least some members also believe in the 
power of influencing through the democratic system. Nearly half of the interviewed 
fighters voted in the previous elections. (114)277 
By its area, Nigeria is the 31st biggest country in the world with a land area 
of 923,769 square km (about three times the size of Finland).278 In the descriptions 
of Boko Haram the news generally referred to its objective of establishing an 
Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. One of the news gave a perspective to the size 
of the area Boko Haram governs, however, this area has been varying due to the 
battles with the government and army. 
 Until a year and a half ago, Boko Haram ruled an area about the size of Belgium: 
villages, towns and roads. Now, however, its fighters have been driven to hide in the 
vast and difficult-to-navigate forests of Northeast Nigeria. (N113)279 
The geography of Northern Nigeria, especially the rough and difficult-to-
cross forest Sambisa was present in many of the news. The forest forms a home 
base for Boko Haram fighters, and Boko Haram has been taking its abductees 
there. The government’s attempts to enter the forest have mainly failed, and the 
forest was depicted as the territory of Boko Haram. 
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The news also contained many references to cities and villages in 
Northeastern Nigeria that were attacked by Boko Haram. The attacks to these 
residences were depicted as events containing killings, attacks to schools and 
universities, destruction of houses and escaping people. However, many of the 
cities and villages are lively markets and have wide agricultural sources of living. 
This perspective was not present in the news data, and the residences were 
depicted just as Boko Haram’s targets. 
5.2.2 Religious and ethnic diversity 
Although Boko Haram is a violent religious extremist group, and the group’s 
objective of establishing an Islamic state under the Sharia law in Northern Nigeria 
was mentioned in many of the news, religion was discussed only briefly. 
Likewise, there were only a few references to the ethnic richness of the country. 
Religion and ethnic diversity were present in 9 of the news (9%). 
Nigerian religious leaders have a visible role in politics, and their role 
affects the religion and vice versa. One of the news told about the statement 36 
state leaders gave about the purity of the doctrine of Boko Haram and the 
interpretation of Islam it represents. The 36 Nigerian state leaders, by common 
consent, condemned the doctrine and jihad Boko Haram represents.280 The 
activities of the movement were recognized to be a war against all Nigerians. 
"We reached a consensus that Boko Haram is not waging a religious war. It is waging a 
war against all Nigerians," the statement said according to the news agency Reuters. 
(N5)281 
The state leaders giving a statement on religion also depicted the intertwined 
relation of religion and politics in Nigeria; politicians use religion as a tool to get 
to power and the religious leaders are using it to gain a personal advantage in 
relation to those in the power. Like Afolabi writes in his article, the relation has 
been complicated ever since Nigeria got its independence.282 This complex 
relation, however, was not discussed in the news data. 
The terminology defining Boko Haram or the violence it perpetrates seemed 
to vary. In the news Boko Haram’s actions were extremism or religious 
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fanaticism. One of the news stated that “in Nigerian terror, religious fanaticism 
and robbery, clothed in the cloak of religion, are shaking hands."283 
There was no wider discussion in the news about the definition of the 
doctrine Boko Haram represents. The reason may lie in mainstream Western 
secularism (value liberalism) in the newspapers and, in the religious phenomena 
being culturally far.284 Due to this, the most appropriate way seems to be handling 
the matter with a dichotomy; a conflict that escalates mostly between Christians 
and Muslims, and geographically between South and North. However, this 
simplified division also may reinforce the bias to associate Islam with all kinds of 
terrorism. It also ignores the fact that over one billion Muslims throughout the 
world desire peaceful coexistence of all people of all religions, and resist terrorism 
and violence in all its forms.285 Moderate Muslims were mentioned in the context 
of conflict and conflict resolution.  
"Terror against girls raises strong anti-Islamic sentiments and reactions in the rest of 
the world. Moderate Islamic forces and states would do themselves a great favour by 
defeating these cowardly terrorist groups together with the international community." 
(N19)286 
"There have been struggles in the region between different branches of Islam. More 
violent Muslims have fought against more moderate ones. In the background, there has 
been criticism against the power elite, which is considered greedy and corrupt." 
(N35)287 
In the news researchers put the Boko Haram phenomena and religion into a 
wider perspective. Although Nigerian jihadism was connected to the wider global 
phenomena of Islamic jihad, and Boko Haram proclaimed its connections to ISIS 
and other extreme Islamist groups in Africa, the movements have had their own 
special characteristics. 
“It would be an exaggeration to consider these as one cohesive group, even though they 
have similar thoughts,” Botha says. (N84)288 
One of the news289 discussed the role of religion in the future development 
of Africa, including Nigeria. Africa has played a major role in advancing 
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tolerance between religions in the world. In the news a researcher stated that the 
rise of extremist movements during the last 15–20 years has escalated the tension 
between Christians and Muslims in Africa. The conflicts in Africa seem to 
concentrate on the geographical line - that also divides the world religions - from 
Sierra Leone to Ethiopia. Nigeria has been a battlefield of jihadists for centuries, 
and the conflict has not always been between Christians and Muslims, but 
between the different branches of Islam. The conflicts also have their connection 
in politics and social circumstances. There has also been criticism against the 
“greed and corrupted” power elite. 290 In the news HS did not specify who form the 
ruling elite. 
Frustration, economic problems and a lack of social cohesion are leading to instigators 
gaining a foothold. 
The same elements can be seen in the current conflict. Nigeria has risen to become the 
continent’s largest economy, largely due to the oil trade. The ruling elite has gotten 
richer, but the northern parts of the country have been neglected, despite whether the 
ruler of the country has been a Christian or a Muslim. 
What is new about the situation in Nigeria is that the events are linked to the ideology 
of global jihadism. (N35)291 
From the several religious groups in Nigeria the news item took the 
Pentecostal movement, representing Christian extremism, as a reference to 
extreme Islam. Although Christians do not commit similar terrorist acts like Boko 
Haram, the rise of Christian fundamentalism, especially the Pentecostal movement 
with its American roots, has had its impact on the escalation. According to the 
news item, as such, the fundamentalism represents Christian extremism. However, 
religious movements have also had a role in peacebuilding: by preaching peace 
the religions can accomplish much good.292 
The publications of Human rights and research organizations were cited in a 
total of 16 news. One of these studies, made in cooperation with the Finnish 
Church Aid, discussed the role of religion in Boko Haram’s recruitment. The 
study stated that religion played a minor role in deciding to join Boko Haram, 
however, many former Boko Haram fighters were dissatisfied with Boko Haram 
not following the teachings of Islam.293 
 57 percent of former fighters interviewed said the main reason to join Boko Haram was 
the desire to revenge. Religion as the main reason for joining was cited by only about 
 
290 N35 (May 18, 2014). 
291 N35 (May 18, 2014). 
292 N35(May 18, 2014). 
293 N114 (October 3, 2016). 
62 
  
nine percent of respondents. Other reasons to join included unemployment, poverty and 
the desire to be feared. (N114)294 
This news item also widened the perspective to Boko Haram related 
conflicts in Northern Nigeria; the study it referred states that Boko Haram’s 
activities are strongly related to the relations of local ethnic groups in Northern 
Nigeria. In addition to this news there was only one other mention of the ethnic 
diversity in Nigeria.295 
5.2.3 Boko Haram objectives or description 
Boko Haram’s objectives or a description of the movement were presented in 58 
of the news. A typical paragraph describing the extreme movement included 
information about the movement’s presence in Northern Nigeria, descriptions of 
its violent actions and, for an example, mainly a brief reference to the case of the 
abducted Chibok schoolgirls. The description of Boko Haram was repetitive and 
consistent in almost all the news; Boko Haram was profiled as a unified group that 
makes violent attacks against targets that are related to Western ideologies or 
education. 
The modus operandi of the Boko Haram Islamists who terrorize Northern Nigeria has 
become regrettably familiar in recent years. Members of the movement kill, mutilate, 
rob and rape their innocent victims. Boko Haram strikes everywhere it smells anything 
with even a hint of Western flavour: Christian churches, markets, restaurants and 
especially schools. (N6)296 
Boko Haram has abducted women, children and young men several times across 
Nigeria. One of the most famous incidents happened last April when terrorists abducted 
276 schoolgirls. Most of them have still not been found. (N78)297 
The definition of Boko Haram seemed to vary in the news. When referring 
to Boko Haram, the terms used in the news were “extreme Islamic movement”, 
“Islamic movement”, “Islamic group” or simply “Islamists” as well as “Jihad 
movement” or “jihadists” without defining what kind of branch of Islam lies 
behind the rise or the movement. The terms “sect”, “Islamic rebel group” and 
“movement” were also used.298  
The video speeches of the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, were 
cited directly in 15 of the news. In these Shekau described the objectives of Boko 
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Haram, blustered about the fate of the abducted schoolgirls, or expressed Boko 
Haram’s desire to exchange the schoolgirls for Boko Haram fighters. 
Representatives of Boko Haram were cited in 20 news in total. 
The abduction of the girls and the descriptions of Boko Haram as a 
dangerous terrorist movement reinforced the movement’s attempt to build an 
image of being an international threat and to capture international news media 
headlines.299 The abducted schoolgirls’ case with international attention has also 
served as a means of bargaining with the government.  
Third of the four HS editorials300 concentrating on the Boko Haram driven 
terrorism and its development in Nigeria stated that the kidnapping of European 
hostages (a French family in 2013) turned the international attention to the events 
in Nigeria and ended up in the U.S. finally adding Boko Haram to the list of 
foreign terrorist organizations. The writing also called for determination to put an 
end to Boko Haram’s activities and reflected the inefficiency of the Nigerian 
government and the international restraint in reacting to the case. 
The faceless terror plaguing Nigeria only rose to world awareness after Boko Haram 
abducted more than 200 teenage schoolgirls in mid-April and announced plans to sell 
them as slaves. Even after that, waking up to the situation has taken a few weeks for the 
world. (N25)301 
The aim of being an international terrorist organization was declaring the 
cooperation with ISIS which, seemingly, has not been widely or even well-known 
inside the organization.302 Boko Haram has not limited its attacks to only Nigeria, 
but the neighbouring countries as well. 
 Boko Haram operates mainly in Nigeria but has also made cross-border attacks on the 
Niger and Cameroon side. The goal of the organization is to establish an Islamic 
caliphate governed by its extreme interpretations of Islam. (N80)303 
Boko Haram has made an alliance agreement with the Islamist organization Isis which 
occupies parts of Iraq and Syria. However, practical cooperation is limited, according 
to experts. (N104)304 
The organization now calls itself the West African province of Isis. (N107)305 
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The descriptions of Boko Haram’s operations included references to 
numbers of deported or killed people and the role of abducted people. While the 
news mostly depicted the uses of women and girls, some of the news also 
contained information about the fate of boys and men who also face extreme 
violence if they resist to convert to Boko Haram’s interpretation of Islam or join 
the movement. 
Young men abducted by terrorists have been killed if they have not agreed to join the 
ranks of the organization. Younger boys have been trained child soldiers. The fate of 
girls and women has been suspected to be the role of wives and servants, but it may be 
that at least for some of them the terrorists have instead reserved the grim task of 
becoming a suicide bomber. (N78)306 
Women are forced into becoming sex slaves or wives for the fighters. Some are forced 
to be fighters, and they may even have to attack their home villages and kill their 
former neighbours. Everyone is forced to convert to Boko Haram’s version of Islam. 
(N88)307 
One of the news in describing Boko Haram also described the disparity in 
the actions of Boko Haram: how the bragging of the fighters is based on targeting 
the weakest victims, like women and girls. 
Ugochi says Boko Haram likes easy victims. The easiest are the girls. The hijackers 
have kept repeating that the girls have no rights. Yet Boko Haram cannot be directly 
compared to the Talebans, who oppose the education of girls. Boko Haram opposes 
Western education in general. Since the abduction, the organization has killed hundreds 
of people, mostly boys. (N39)308 
There were several estimations about the number of the victims and the 
impact of Boko Haram’s attacks. The numbers incoherently varied depending on 
the source used in the news. Comparing numbers outside Boko Haram’s 
operations was rare, which made it difficult to figure out the amplitude of the 
presented numbers. 
 The independent think tank American Council on Foreign Relations estimated that 
Boko Haram had caused more than ten thousand violent deaths between November 
2013 and November 2014. One and a half million people have already had to leave 
their homes because of Boko Haram. The much-talked-about Ebola epidemic killed 
about 8,400 people in West Africa last year. (N82)309 
Boko Haram has been terrorizing the Northeastern part of Nigeria for seven years. As 
many as 20,000 people are believed to have died and more than two million have been 
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forced to flee their homes in 2009 after the fighting. The fighting has also spread to 
neighbour countries Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. (N112)310 
5.3 Government inactivity and politics 
The government’s actions and interventions were described in 37 of the 105 news. 
However, many of the statements of the authorities seemed to be incoherent, or 
even confusing, and this together with the government’s inactivity in resolving the 
Chibok schoolgirls’ case also has raised wide mistrust in the government’s 
actions. This was openly stated in the news as well. 
The Chibok schoolgirls’ case also raised international awareness and other 
countries offered their help in fighting Boko Haram and in releasing the girls. The 
aspect of politics, negotiations and international interventions was present in 58 of 
the news (55%). 
In this frame theme group I elaborate on the Nigerian government’s 
inactivity and politics with three frame categories that were recognized in the 
news data: Government or security interventions and control, False news and 
mistrust, and Politics, negotiations, and international interventions. 
5.3.1 Government or security intervention and control 
Right from the start when the Chibok schoolgirls’ case became public, the 
Nigerian government and security forces declared their intention to find and set 
free the abducted girls. The information, however, was delayed and confusing, 
containing even lies. The authorities also frequently gave statements about what 
went on with the case, but on the face of it the efforts remained highly ineffective. 
The HS news also reflected this unclarity and the local residents’ distrust in 
government’s attempts. The Nigerian government’s and security forces’ 
interventions and control over the situation was present in 37 of the news (35%). 
 Nigerian security officials say they have launched a major operation to find the girls. 
However, some residents in the area are sceptical of the promises. (N3)311 
The master of this wilderness is Boko Haram, in front of which the Nigerian 
government seems powerless. Either the government is planning massive operations to 
rescue the girls. Or it just doesn’t care. (N8)312 
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The editorial of HS,313 referring to a regional newspaper Keskisuomalainen 
reflected the scale of the unsuccessful rescue operations of the Chibok schoolgirls 
by making a comparison to a plane accident that took place almost at the same 
time.314 The editorial stated that forgetting the schoolgirls was telling about 
attitudes:  
“Girls and young women, captured into sex slavery for the rest of their lives, have been 
in the unknown for weeks. At the same time, elsewhere, as many as 25 countries were 
feverishly searching for a plane that had crashed into the sea, and whose passengers 
could no longer be alive." (N19) 315 
The news contained frequently both the state and federal government 
representatives’ statements about the attempts to save the girls. The case became a 
scene for Nigerian internal politics and international interventions. The president 
also declared war against Boko Haram and authorized the troops to use any legal 
means to fight it - although there already had been a state-of-war like situation in 
the area.316 
The Nigerian army sends two military divisions to search for the abducted schoolgirls. 
Soldiers are being sent to Northeastern Nigeria to the state of Borno, where they are 
cooperating with, among others, the police. A division usually has about 10,000 to 
20,000 soldiers. (N24)317 
The President did not specify what such means meant. For more than a year, the areas 
terrorized by Boko Haram have been in a state of emergency and under a full-scale 
military operation. Despite this, Nigerian forces have been unable to protect civilians in 
the region. (N41)318 
The Chibok case led to public demonstrations and rallies in the capital 
Abuja. However, president Goodluck Jonathan banned the public rallies saying 
that the they should be targeted against the Islamists, not the government.319 
After the abduction of the Chibok girls there were many other attacks that 
took place in schools and public places. The news described how the abductions 
became politically sensitive and how the authorities published the news with 
delays and with uncertain claims.320 One of the news also described how the 
Nigerian army detained one businessman who was suspected to have been 
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involved in the Chibok schoolgirls’ case as well as other attacks.321 The fate of the 
detained remained untold in the news, and made publishing this kind of a detail 
confusing in a larger-scale view. 
In June 2014 the news cited a report published by the Nigerian army. 
Despite the previous news about releasing the girls and the army knowing where 
they were kept,322 the confusing news was, that Nigerian authorities suspended the 
investigation aiming at finding the girls.323 
 In addition to those abducted last week, the more than 200 schoolgirls abducted by 
Boko Haram in April are still missing. On Friday, Nigerian authorities closed 
investigations of the case with almost no results. (N46)324 
The releases or citations by the spokesmen of the Nigerian army were 
sources or direct quotes in many of the news conveyed by the news agencies. The 
army seemed to use exact numbers and details in its releases, however, many of 
the numbers were later corrected by residents, and the releases seemed to be 
unreliable. As an example, the Nigerian army had claimed three times that Boko 
Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau was dead, but the news later turned out to be 
false. Also the identity of Shekau, in an attack against Boko Haram seemed to be 
unclear.325 This case also reflected the news production process where the news 
agency transmitting content concerning a distant event seemed to have been 
published without further criticism.  
 Olukolade pointed out on Wednesday that the true identity of the Boko Haram leader is 
not important. According to the Major General, the name Shekau has become a brand 
name for terrorists. 
"The Nigerian army is determined to bring to justice anyone who uses this name and 
terrorists who want to harm Nigeria's territory and freedom," Olukolade added. 
(N59)326 
The news also revealed unjust proceedings by the official counterparties in 
Nigeria. The case reflected the confusing and violent situation in the country, 
where all the parties of the conflict, the government representatives as well the 
terrorists, might have been taking the same violent actions. Authorities using 
incompetent and unarmed civilian forces in armed conflicts or sentencing soldiers 
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to death without decent juridical proceedings would be an act against human 
rights in the Western countries and as such, a big news. 
The military has been accused of outsourcing front-line fighting to the responsibility of 
volunteer villagers and hunters. Volunteers have little training and their weapons are 
miserable. 
On Wednesday, an army field court sentenced 54 soldiers to death for rebelling because 
they refused to attack Boko Haram. The soldiers said they did not have enough 
weapons. The case reflects the difficulties the army has in fighting the rebels, with even 
its own soldiers accusing the army of using them only as cannon fodder against heavily 
armed rebels. (N72)327 
The news also covered stories on how the residents of villages suffered from 
the random attacks of government forces and the army.  
Innocent civilians have also suffered in the airstrikes. On Tuesday, a Nigerian fighter 
bombed a village on the Niger side where people had gathered for a funeral. 36 people 
died. According to Nigeria, the pilot of the plane had thought the villagers were fleeing 
insurgents. (N83)328 
 “When the military attacks, it could destroy an entire village and kill people no matter 
who they are,” says Mahdi Abdile, another author of the study. He leads work against 
violent radicalization with the Finnish Church Aid. (N114)329 
5.3.2 False news and mistrust 
Typical of the news about Boko Haram was the constant ambiguity of the event 
reporting, especially when the news was citing the Nigerian authorities. The 
Nigerian government’s releases also contained false information, even lies. False 
news or the reflection of mistrust was found as a frame in 30 of the 105 news 
(29%). 
The case of Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction in April 2014 reflected the uses 
of ambiguity information well. The army representatives first declared the number 
of abducted schoolgirls in Chibok to be eight.330 Later the number was corrected to 
be 129, but according to the parents, the correct number was 230.331 Two days 
after the attack the spokesman of the Nigerian army had declared that the girls had 
all been rescued, but the school representatives and relatives of the abducted girls 
revealed that the statement was false.332 Amnesty International later revealed that 
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the army was – hours in advance – aware of the attack to the Chibok school but 
did not take any measures to prevent it.333 
A local Nigerian interviewee explained the authorities’ inactivity with the 
poor work conditions of the police and army forces and the negligence of the 
government and the president.334 
I ask what Ugochi thinks of the Amnesty report. “I wasn’t surprised,” she says. "In the 
military and police no one has received their salaries for a long time. They're not 
risking their lives because of the schoolgirls." 
Ugochi accounts the situation to the negligence of the Nigerian government and 
president. 
"Because of corruption, money never ends up where it should. Boko Haram can do 
anything because the police and military are in a miserable state. Boko Haram only 
gains power because the government is even more wretched." (N39)335 
In the news there were many more examples of false or unclear information. 
In October 2014 the head of the Nigerian army said there was an agreement on a 
ceasefire and on the release of the schoolgirls with Boko Haram, but just some 
days after the statement Boko Haram attacked again.336  
The editorial of HS337, half a year after the Chibok event, also referred to the 
inefficiency of the Nigerian military forces and the prevalent mistrust towards the 
Nigerian government. It also noted that in focusing attention on ISIS terrorist 
attacks and violence in Iraq and Syria, the world’s news feeds had forgotten about 
Boko Haram’s blind violence and the abducted 200 schoolgirls. 
On January 7, 2015, two terrorists entered the office of the weekly magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France killing 12 persons and injuring 11. Four days 
earlier Boko Haram had invaded the remoted city of Baga, killing about 2,000 
people. HS first wrote about the Baga attack on January 9th, 2015. According to 
estimates by human rights organizations, based on satellite images, about 3,700 
buildings had been destroyed in Baga.  
Kano. Fighters from the jihadist organization Boko Haram have destroyed a dozen 
towns and villages in Northeastern Nigeria this week, local authorities say. According 
to the authorities, villages and towns have been burned to the ground. 
Many villagers have fled the attacks to the islands of Lake Chad. Authorities say at 
least a hundred people have been killed in the city of Bagan alone last night. (N76)338 
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The attack proved to be one of the cruellest in the history of Boko Haram. 
The Nigerian authorities or president Goodluck Jonathan did not comment on it, 
nor did any other African country leaders. The event did not get much coverage in 
the Nigerian newspapers. Instead, Jonathan gave a statement calling for mutual 
actions of peace, progress and freedom-lovers against the brutality that was seen 
in Paris. HS commented on the access to the remote areas and other difficulties in 
reporting.339 
Jonathan said nothing about the massacre in his own country that week. No apologies, 
no condemnation, nothing. 
Surprisingly, Baga did not initially become particularly big news in the African media, 
not even in Nigeria. The big reason was the difficulty of reporting. The areas controlled 
by Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria are inaccessible to outsiders. Acquiring 
information requires resources and is dangerous. (N79)340 
International media was criticized for giving less attention to the event in 
Baga than to the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. However, international news 
agencies and big media houses like BBC and Al-Jazeera reported on Baga first.341 
The HS news noted that both the Nigerian army and Boko Haram had a 
tendency of overstating their success as well as understating their losses.342 Due to 
this, the news about their actions was not considered trustworthy343 and there was 
suspicion that the Nigerian government had not taken any measures to find and 
release the captured children and women.344 
In March 2016, the newspapers cited Human Rights Watch’s release about 
the abduction of more than 300 children in November 2014. This news also 
confirmed the government’s inactivity and unwillingness to publish transparent 
news.345  
Boko Haram attacked Damascus on November 24, 2014. The attack killed more than 
200 people, according to village elders interviewed by the news agency AFP. 
Boko Haram fighters immediately took over the school in the village and locked the 
school's 300 students there. According to HRW, the pupils were between the ages of 7 
and 17. “Three hundred children have been missing for a year, and yet there has been 
not a word from the Nigerian government,” HRW researcher Mausi Segun said in a 
statement on the organisation's website. 
"The government did not want the news to spread." (N102)346 
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Boko Haram continued its violent attacks and abducted more than a hundred 
schoolgirls in Dapchi in February 2018. The Nigerian government continued 
publishing information that turned out to be incorrect, again: 
The Nigerian government confirmed on Sunday that 110 girls have disappeared since 
last week’s attack on the school by the jihadist organization Boko Haram, AFP news 
agency reported. 
It took several days for the country's leaders to admit the disappearance of young 
schoolchildren. Initially, authorities denied that anyone had been abducted in 
connection with the attack. (N122)347 
 President Muhammadu Buhari later apologized to the parents of the 
abducted children. 
“This is a national disaster. We are sorry that this could have happened,” he said, 
according to AFP. (N122)348 
The government of Nigeria has not only controlled public information about 
Boko Haram, but also access to the released Chibok schoolgirls. After about half 
of them were released after negotiations with Boko Haram in October 2016 and 
February 2018, the girls were taken to a government’s safe house in the capital 
Abuja. An international filming group stayed in the house for one week making a 
document of the girls’ lives in freedom. The brief about the tv-document in HS 
also told about government control: 
103 young women were freed from the clutches of terrorists - now they and their 
stories are closely guarded by the Nigerian state. 
The HBO documentary depicts women released from the terrorist group Boko Haram. 
The work is most interesting when it tells about state control. (N125)349 
5.3.3 Politics, negotiations, interventions 
A total of 58 of the news (55%) dealt with politics, negotiations and various kinds 
of international interventions to solve the conflict between the Nigerian 
government and Boko Haram. 
After the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls, the negotiations for their 
release between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram advanced very slowly. 
According to the news, Boko Haram’s stand was clearly stated in the videos it 
published; it aimed at exchanging the girls for the captured Boko Haram fighters. 
The Nigerian government was stated to be opposed to the exchange. 
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Nigerian extreme Islamist organization Boko Haram said in a video released on 
Monday that it would release the girls, abducted in April, if the movement’s 
imprisoned fighters were also released. The Nigerian interior minister said it did not 
intend to agree to the demands. (N29)350 
HS news also told how Nigeria received offers of international aid to 
resolve the situation. One of the “peacebuilders” was the Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani girl who was injured in a Taleban attack in 
2012 and since then had been campaigning for human rights. Yousafzai came to 
Nigeria to have a meeting with the Nigerian president.351 
Many countries offered help to fight Boko Haram. In October 2014, the 
Chadian president Idriss Deby and authorities from Cameroon acted as mediators 
in negotiations held in Saudi Arabia between the Nigerian government and Boko 
Haram.352 Both Boko Haram and Nigeria stated that a ceasefire had been agreed 
on.353 The Nigerian government also said that the negotiations on liberating the 
abducted schoolgirls had been successful.354 However, in November Boko Haram 
published a video where they denied the ceasefire. 
Nigerian internal politics were visibly present in the news about Boko 
Haram and the abducted Chibok schoolgirls. The country held presidential 
elections in the spring of 2015. The elections were described to have become 
difficult, and the voting percentage was predicted to be low due to the tense 
situation in Northeastern Nigeria.355 Because of the threat of Boko Haram’s 
attacks, the elections were postponed from February 2015 to the end of March. 
The presidential elections also reduced the government’s willingness to intervene 
in the operations of Boko Haram. 
 Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (with 170 million inhabitants), the 
largest economy in Africa and a major oil producer. The country's presidential and 
parliamentary elections this year have reduced the willingness of the state leaders to 
intervene with Boko Haram. (N82)356 
Goodluck Jonathan lost the elections to the former military leader 
Muhammadu Buhari.357 According to experts’ estimations, the failure in resolving 
of the conflicts with Boko Haram and the Chibok schoolgirls case played a part in 
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the loss of Jonathan.358 The new president Buhari again promised to do his all to 
liberate the girls.359 
The situation with Boko Haram seemed to remain unchanged. In December 
2015 and August 2016, the news cited videos released by Boko Haram demanding 
the exchange of its captured fighters with the Chibok schoolgirls.360 This time the 
response was consent and the Nigerian president gave an acquiescing response at 
the end of August. 
The Nigerian government would be ready to negotiate with Boko Haram leaders on the 
hostages, Buhari reiterated on Sunday. According to the president, Boko Haram would 
choose one of the foreign organizations to be a mediator. (113)361 
In October 2016 the news told about successful negotiations and a happy 
reunion; 21 of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls are released and returned to their 
families.362 
 “This is only the first step. We believe that the rest of the girls will also be released. 
We have already started new negotiations,” Nigerian Information Minister Lai 
Muhammad said, according to Reuters. (N116)363 
In December 2016 the Nigerian army reported that one of the Chibok 
schoolgirls had been found with a baby.364 Still, 200 schoolgirls remained missing. 
Some of them were reported to have died or disappeared.365 
A weakened Boko Haram released a new group of Chibok schoolgirls in 
May 2017, and Nigeria, in turn, released Boko Haram fighters. The anonymous 
governmental source in the news said the number of liberated girls to be 82, but 
the information was not verified, nor the number of the released fighters. Peace 
negotiators from Switzerland and the International Red Cross assisted in the 
negotiations.366 
During the Chibok schoolgirls abduction, many foreign countries and the 
UN offered their help to Nigeria. Nigerian authorities also declared that they had 
asked for help. There was plenty of news repeating the statements of cooperation. 
According to the news the assistance to the Nigerian government was mainly 
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technical. In May 2015, the U.S. sent seven FBI officers and an expert with the 
foreign ministry to Nigeria.367 The UK and France promised to send experts, 
China offered intelligence and satellite information,368 and also Israel joined to 
countries in offering its experts to help Nigeria.369 The U.S. further used spotter 
planes, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and satellite images in locating the 
missing girls.370 Nigeria also agreed on sharing satellite image and tightening 
border security with the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and 
Benin.371 The U.S. later sent 80 marine soldiers to assist in the rescue efforts.372  
In May 2015 an international meeting was held in Paris, France to discuss 
the fight against Boko Haram. Present in the meeting were Nigeria, Benin, 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger.373 After the meeting the Chadian president Idriss 
Deby gave a statement that the countries were ready to start an all-out war against 
Boko Haram. The Nigerian president Goodwill also hinted that Nigeria would 
turn to the UN Security Council in issues related to Boko Haram.374 
 Nigeria is a rotating member of the Security Council but has been reluctant to 
cooperate internationally to defeat Boko Haram. (N33)375 
Boko Haram was added to the United Nations Security Council 
Consolidated List (also known as the al-Qaeda list) on May, 2014.376 The 
declaration was given after the UN Security Council had unanimously stated that 
group’s abductions could be considered as " crimes against humanity" under 
international law. The declaration came after Boko Haram had already been 
carrying out its violent attacks already since 2009.377  
 The inefficiency of the Nigerian government and the international restraint have, so far, 
worked quite in the opposite way than what was apparently hoped. The United States 
did not add Boko Haram to its list of terrorist organizations in the past to prevent the 
organization from benefiting from international attention, the New York Times reports. 
(N25)378 
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In practice, the listing means that the organization is subject to an arms embargo and 
travel ban and that its funds are frozen. The listing was requested by Nigeria, which has 
not previously resorted to outside help in its fight against Boko Haram. (N38)379 
 In the news the Nigerian government was criticized for the missing 
leadership it showed in the efforts to find the schoolgirls. A local Nigerian 
interviewee deemed the criticism to be justified because the government had not 
shown any plans to lead the international efforts in rescuing the girls. 
The international operation is also hampered by another problem: it can only succeed if 
Nigeria leads it. Ugochi does not believe that will happen. 
"In Nigeria, there is no structure, nor a plan to save the girls. Our president expects the 
Americans to bomb Boko Haram away in Hollywood style." (N39)380 
In January 2015 the leaders of West African countries announced to 
consider to assembling international troops to fight Boko Haram. However, 
financing and managing the operation had not been resolved.381 The counterattacks 
against Boko Haram started in February. 
 Now Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin are launching a joint war operation 
against Boko Haram. The countries are assembling a special unit of 8,700 soldiers. 
(N83)382 
The news noted the attacks, but only one of the articles showed criticism for 
the offer for assistance in the form of sending Western troops to fight Boko 
Haram: 
The focus of military operations should shift to the protection of civilians, says ICG 
researcher Obasi. He says Nigeria needs foreign aid, but a Western military force in the 
Muslim-majority area "is not an option". (N84)383 
In 2016 the news told about a weakened Boko Haram and the destruction of 
its bases. Also, internal power struggles had weakened the group.384 
 Soldiers from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad launched a joint operation last year 
to defeat the jihadists, and since then Boko Haram’s bases have been largely destroyed. 
The organization still terrorizes Nigeria and the border regions of its neighbours. 
(N111)385 
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5.4 Terrorism and violence 
The missing Chibok schoolgirls and how they were presented in the news, is the 
comprehensive theme of this study. However, the girls’ case was mainly presented 
as a reference in the news reporting other attacks or proceedings with Boko 
Haram. The fate of the girls could be found as a frame in 78 of the 105 news 
(74%).  
As such, the schoolgirls case is just one of the many attacks of Boko Haram. 
35 of the news (33%) told about violence and terrorism in general, and 48 of the 
news (46%) framed other attacks the Boko Haram has made. Some of these other 
attacks might have been even more shocking than the Chibok schoolgirls’ case.  
5.4.1 The missing Chibok schoolgirls 
The missing Chibok schoolgirls became a reference theme in the news about 
Nigeria and Boko Haram, but their fate remained unclear. In the news the case 
was referred to as the most well-known attack of Boko Haram. A description of 
the case was found in 78 of the news (74%). 
 Boko Haram has abducted women, children and young men several times across 
Nigeria. One of the most famous incidents happened last April when the terrorists 
abducted 276 schoolgirls. The majority of them have still not been found. (N78)386 
Sunday’s abduction was the largest since Boko Haram spread [its operations] from 
Nigeria to Cameroon last year. The best-known single abduction is that of 276 girls 
from a school in Chibok, Nigeria in April 2014. Boko Haram has killed thousands, in 
early January alone an estimated 2,000 people in the city of Bagan. (N81)387 
When the abduction took place in April 2014 the total number of girls, aged 
16 to 18 years, varied depending on the source, and later was later revised to be 
276. Some of the schoolgirls were able to escape during the attack, or later during 
transportation, but the remaining girls were taken to the Sambisa forest.388  
The case got international publicity just two weeks after it happened. One of 
the main factors was the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag campaign in social media, 
which grew into a global campaign with promoters like Hillary Clinton and 
Michelle Obama, and was referred to in other media as well, including HS 
news.389 The campaign with public personas as its promoters was also criticized 
and seen as not having an impact.  
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 The mass abduction of girls has incited social media users to demand more vigorous 
rescue efforts from the authorities. The #BringBackOurGirls hashtag has spread from 
Twitter to the protester banners on the streets. (N16)390 
Also, the way the campaign to liberate the girls spread in the West is disruptive. 
Celebrities like actress Anne Hathaway made statements in which Boko Haram and the 
Talebans appeared as one united group from whose grip we can save the girls. (N39)391 
The residents also tried to trace the girls. Very soon after the abduction the 
community got information that some of the girls were sold as wives to Chad and 
Cameroon with a price comparable to 10 euros.392  
The abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls and the publicity the case received 
served as a means for Boko Haram to get international publicity as a cruel 
extremist group.393 The videos it published via AFP were cited in the HS news as 
well. In the videos of Boko Haram - the first of which was published two weeks 
after the abduction and the second one week later - Abubakar Shekau said that the 
girls had converted to Muslims and that Allah forces him to sell the girls.394 
 Abubakar Shekau, director of the extreme Islamic organization Boko Haram, vows to 
sell the girls abducted by the organization. Girls should not attend Western schools, 
declares the leader. The video of the terrorist leader also incites violence against 
Christians. The video caught by the news agency AFP was originally 57 minutes long. 
(N10 )395 
 "We have liberated the girls. They have become Muslims," Shekau says. In the 
recording, Shekau chuckles in the middle of his speech and often repeats his words. 
(N29)396 
On the other hand, the reporting about Boko Haram was said to be 
shadowed by other news about violence and terrorism in Syria and Iraq.397 
A lot of the information about the fate of the Chibok schoolgirls rested on 
the reports of human rights organizations. These reports also included interviews 
of other girls and women who had survived or been able to escape Boko Haram. 
In the reports the victims told how they had been tortured, raped, or forced to 
marriages.398 Some were also forced to kill and act as suicide bombers. The 
witnesses of Boko Haram’s attacks told the same. 
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 Some of the Nigerian girls abducted by the Islamist group Boko Haram have been 
forced to fight. According to an eyewitness, the girls slit the throats of Christian men, 
the BBC reports. (N96)399 
Some of the girls now must terrorize other prisoners and even kill them. The BBC was 
unable to confirm the allegations, but according to the studies by the human rights 
organization Amnesty International, Islamists are training girls to fight. (N96)400 
The Chibok schoolgirls became a symbol of the terror of Boko Haram, and 
continuous referring to their fate in the news may have led to ignorance of the 
other violent attacks and abductions in Nigeria. By 2016, an approximated 2,000 
girls, women and children had been abducted.401 Human rights organizations tried 
to raise awareness for the other human rights violations in their releases. 
"Unfortunately, these still missing girls are only a small proportion of the abductees of 
Boko Haram in recent years," secretary-general of human rights organization Amnesty 
International Salid Shetty told The New York Times. (N88)402 
In May 2016 a group of voluntary commandos found one of the Chibok 
schoolgirls, carrying a baby, in the Sambisa forest near the border of Cameroon. 
She was the first of the Chibok girls to be saved, but the news told how her 
identity needed to be confirmed by the Chibok parents’ association and the 
Nigerian army.403  
The next group of 21 Chibok schoolgirls was released in October 2016, after 
two and a half years of capture. The release succeeded after the negotiations, in 
which present were also the representatives of the International Red Cross and the 
Swizz government.404 This release also raised hope to find the rest of the more 
than 200 missing girls.405 
The fifth of the editorials in HS,406 two years after the abduction, again 
concentrated on the Chibok schoolgirls. The editorial discussed the contradictions 
of raising a “little princess” in a privileged Western country versus the abducted, 
missing Chibok girls, who may have become brainwashed, raped and or forced to 
become suicide bombers, or those who have been able to escape, may have 
become pariahs, abandoned by their families as a shame to their prior community. 
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The editorial ended up discussing free mobility, human rights, and education, 
especially from the perspective of the girls.  
In November 2016, another Chibok girl with a baby was found.407 The next 
good news about liberation was published in May 2017, three years after the 
abduction. An anonymous Nigerian source, representing the government, 
informed that a weakened Boko Haram had released a total of 82 Chibok girls by 
exchanging them for Boko Haram insurgents.408 However, still more than 100 girls 
remained captured or missing. Some of the girls had also died, and some were not 
willing to return.409 
 Some of the girls, who were abducted four years ago, have been released, the fate of 
some remains unknown, and some do not want to return home because they have been 
radicalized among the jihadists or are too ashamed of the events. Girls have also been 
forced to marry jihadists and have children with them. (N121)410 
There were some topics missing from the HS news, like the recovery and 
further settlement to the normal life of the released Boko Haram abductees. This 
theme has been widely present in Nigerian and international media after the 
release of the 82 Chibok girls in May 2017. In HS the recovery process was 
present only in one news in the radio and tv section, referring to a forthcoming 
television documentary about the released Chibok girls. The description of the 
documentary in HS comments that staying in the safe house was reminiscent of a 
prison, and the documentary looked like a well-orchestrated play, aimed at 
gaining good publicity.411 
 Freedom, however, is reminiscent of a prison. The women have settled in a government 
safe house surrounded by a wall and protected by armed guards. The film crew has 
been banned from asking what happened to the women in captivity. (N125)412 
In the document the filming group was told that none of the girls did 
become infected with HIV or was pregnant at the time of the release. (N125)413  
Although HS in its news did not elaborate the recovery of the Chibok 
schoolgirls, the television documentary itself was an interesting depiction of their 
 
407 N119 (November 5, 2016). 
408 N120 (May 6, 2017). 
409 N120 (May 6, 2017); N121 (February 21, 2018). 
410 N121 (February 21, 2018). 
411 Stolen Daughters 2018. 
412 N125 (October 26, 2018). In the documentary Stolen Daughters (2018) the Minister of 
Women’s Affairs advices both the girls as well as the filming group not to speak about what 
happened in the Sambisa forest. 
413 N 125 (October 26, 2018). 
80 
  
recovery process. The documentary “Stolen Daughters” tells about how the 
released Chibok schoolgirls, like some of the earlier released Boko Haram 
captured girls, are settled in a government’s rehabilitation centre, “safe house”, 
surrounded by walls and secured with armed guards, and located in Abuja, 900 
kilometres from their homes in Chibok.  
The authorities also controlled access to the girls; according to the Nigerian 
government representatives the girls were kept in secure conditions to ensure their 
rehabilitation. Also the parents had a limited access to the girls.414 When the girls 
visited their homes in Chibok, they were not allowed to stay in their families’ 
homes due to the said risk of being kidnapped again.415 
In the Nigerian media there has been discussion whether keeping the girls in 
the government’s safe house, was about the government’s care, or just keeping 
them again in custody again.416 The girls were taken to the safe house for psycho-
social therapy and for refocusing them back to education, “giving the girls the 
education that was stolen from them.”417  
For the next four months, the women’s affairs ministry will be home to the 82 girls, 
and a team of psychologists will help to heal the mental wounds they have suffered in 
the past three years of captivity. They will then be sent to schools across Nigeria, 
although none will return to Chibok.418 
“We believe the girls by September will be fully recovered psychologically, next 
school year we enrol them.” 419 
The escaped and rescued Chibok girls were offered a government-paid 
studentship in the American University of Nigeria (AUN) at the campus of Yola, 
Northeastern Nigeria. The university is known for being an elite university that 
attracts the children of government ministers and ambassadors. However, since 
the girls came from a “poor-quality” government school and hardly spoke 
English, they needed preparation for the studies. The 57 girls who were able to 
escape Boko Haram in April 2014 and who were willing to continue their studies, 
were first offered a special tailor-made preparatory program in the New 
Foundation School (NFS) to prepare them for the university studies. The 82 girls 
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rescued later were also offered the same opportunity of studying at AUN. Some of 
the girls have since continued their studies abroad in the U.S. and Italy.420 
In the recovery of the Chibok schoolgirls education has been seen as the key 
topic with regard to freedom, and the future. Margret, one of the released girls in 
the government’s safe house sums it up in the “Stolen Daughters” documentary: 
“Freedom means when you have the right to do whatever you want at any time.”421 
5.4.2 Terrorism, violence 
The terrorism of Boko Haram was present as a frame in 35 of the news (33%) in 
the data of this study. The news mainly described the terrorism in Nigeria in 
general, and the state-of-war in Northeastern Nigeria. One of the news also 
described the situation of sexual violence in Africa, saying that it is customary in 
the conflicts in African countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central 
African Republic, and Mali.422 
When talking about terrorism in Nigeria it is easy to refer to Boko Haram 
and its profile as an extreme terrorist group. However, it seems that more civilians 
have been killed in the fight against terrorism than in the attacks made by Boko 
Haram. In the HS news the role of the Nigerian government in the atrocities was 
recognized, but not widely discussed. The government’s role in violence was 
visible for example in a description of a documentary called “Hunting Boko 
Haram/ Nigeria’s hidden war”, also known as Nigeria's Dirty War.423 
The hell into what Northern Nigeria has drifted is summed up in a local woman's 
statement: "Boko Haram performs the bloodshed, and then the army takes our man." 
Often men disappear into cadres. 
The method used by the group involves gathering of young men in each village, 
beating and other torture, and ultimately killing or handing them over to the army for 
ill-treatment. It is estimated that thousands of innocent lives have been lost. 
Sometimes the beatings are commented on by anonymous parties, sometimes by a 
human rights expert who states - needlessly - that in this case, there is torture, which is 
a war crime and here a civilian is killed, which is also a war crime. Recorded killings 
are at least not displayed. (N60)424 
Measured by the number of victims and attacks, Nigeria, together with Syria 
and Iraq, is among the countries with the most attacks of Islamic terrorism. 
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However, terrorism in Nigeria has not reached the same international attention as 
in terrorism related to Iraq and Syria.425 This may partly be due to the networks of 
al-Qaeda which have formed a threat for the Western countries as well. The threat 
was realized in France in the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. 
Islamist terrorism remains a predominant problem in Islamic countries and territories. 
The Intel Center, which quantifies terrorism, tells in its statistics for the past 30 days 
that the worst was in Nigeria, Iraq, and Syria - more than half of the world’s terrorist 
activity. Every base for violent organizations is also a threat in the Western countries. 
Yemen is a shaky state. According to unconfirmed allegations by al-Qaeda in Yemen, 
it trained the men who went with guns in their hands to the Charlie Hebdo office. 
(N79)426 
At the same time of the Charlie Hebdo attack in France, Boko Haram 
accomplished the bloodiest act of its history in Baga. While world leaders, 
including the former Nigerian president Jonathan Goodluck, were marching for 
peace in Paris, Boko Haram killed more than 2,000 civilians in an attack on a 
remote village Baga in Northeastern Nigeria.427 In addition to the state leaders in 
Nigeria, also the Nigerian – and also largely African – media were first silent 
about the case. The first ones to report the atrocities were large international news 
agencies like the BBC and Al-Jazeera.428 
Many of the news told about the causes of Boko Haram terrorism. 
According to UNICEF, 1.3 million children in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and 
Niger had been forced to flee and about 2,000 schools had been closed due to the 
threat of Boko Harams atrocities. Missing school and education makes the 
children an easy and vulnerable target to Boko Haram to be abused, abducted, or 
used as child fighters or suicide bombers.429 According to the report by UNICEF, a 
total of 44 children were used in suicide bombings only in 2015 alone. 430 
“Cheating and forcing children into perpetrators of deadly attacks is one of the most 
horrific features of the violence in Nigeria and its neighbouring countries,” UNICEF 
Regional Director Manuel Fontaine said in a statement. (104)431 
Boko Haram has abducted a total of thousands of girls and women since the beginning 
of its large-scale violence in 2009, killing some 20,000 people and resulting in the 
fleeing of more than 2.6 million. (N122)432 
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5.4.3 Other attacks 
Although the most well-known case, the Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction is just one 
of the many violent attacks of Boko Haram that the news told about. The attacks 
of the group mainly cause civilian casualties. As an example, just before the attack 
to Chibok in April 2014, Boko Haram had attacked another school in the same 
area. The group also was suspected of being responsible for a bomb attack at a bus 
station, killing more than 70 people in the capital Abuja in April 2014.433 
The attacks and kidnappings in the northeastern part of the country 
continued after the invasion to the Chibok school. In the beginning of May 2014, 
Boko Haram abducted eight more girls, aged 12 to 15 years, in a night-time attack 
in the Warabe village in the northeastern part of the country. A local villager and 
an anonymous police source told that, together with stolen cattle and food 
supplies, they girls had been taken by trucks from the village.434 
In mid-May armed men destroyed two empty schools in Shardak and 
Darazo, both near the Chibok village. The Nigerian police did not confirm 
whether the attack was made by Boko Haram.435 In Chinkongudo local police 
reported fighters who came in motorcycles and cars to have killed 29 farmers, 
burned the houses, and stolen the food of the residents. In the capital Abuja 118 
people were killed in two disastrous bomb attacks. 436 
In June, according to a police source, more than 42 people were killed in an 
attack to the Bardar village. Just two days earlier attackers had killed tens of 
people in three villages in Borno.437 A later news article told about an execution of 
more than 200 civilians.438 On June 9, 2014 in the Garkin Fulan village Boko 
Haram kidnapped 20 women and three young men who tried to prevent the 
abduction. The news about the abduction came at the same time when people in 
Maiduguri were burying more than 100 people who had been killed by Boko 
Haram. The people who had fled Boko Haram also told that there were more 
corpses in the nearby bushes and hills. Funerals were held in nine villages.439 
Just two weeks later Boko Haram surrounded the village of Kummabza, 
burned the houses, kidnapped more than 60 girls, and killed 30 people. In Kano 
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city a bomb in a heath care school killed eight people and wounded more than 20. 
In the previous week a bomb had killed 20 people who were watching the soccer 
World Cup.440 
In mid-July 38 civilians were killed and the whole village was burned in an 
attack. The attackers drove motorcycles and threw explosives into the houses. 
Some of the villagers who tried to escape, got killed by the firing of army 
planes.441 At the end of the month a female suicide bomber blew herself up in a 
university in Kano causing the death of six people. It was just one of the many 
suicide bomb attacks to schools and gas stations during the same days.442 The 
attacks were suspected to have been done by Boko Haram. 
In October 2014 the Nigerian army told about a ceasefire with Boko Haram. 
Soon after the announcement the attackers, who were suspected to be Boko 
Haram, invaded two villages and killed many civilians according to security 
sources and eyewitnesses.443 At the end of the month the news told about the 
abduction of 30 children and younglings. Again, Boko Haram was suspected of 
the attack.444 The total number of abducted women and girls rose to 500 during the 
five year period 2000 – 2014.445 
At the end of October 2014, a bomb killed eight civilians in the city of 
Gombe.446 Later in November an explosion in a school in the state of Yobe killed 
48 people and left 79 wounded. The suicide bomber was said to have worn a 
school uniform.447 
The next mass abduction took place some days before Christmas 2014 in 
Gumsur, but information about the event was published with a couple of days’ 
delay due to destroyed infrastructure and collapsed phone lines. In the attack Boko 
Haram kidnapped a total of 191 women, girls and boys, and killed 32 people. The 
attack was reported by people who escaped the village.448 
In January 2015 Boko Haram kidnapped 40 men and boys in Borno state. 
They also attacked Baga, a city of 10,000 inhabitants, which was said to be the 
last city under the government’s rule in the area. Before the abduction of the 
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Chibok schoolgirls Boko Haram had been attacking the city and had killed about 
200 people there.449 
 The year 2015 had a cruel start in Northeastern Nigeria. According to local 
authorities Boko Haram had destroyed more than ten villages and the residents 
had escaped to the Lake Chad islands. The news first told about the killing of a 
hundred people in Baga.450 The authorities later clarified the number to be almost 
2,000 in a week. The massacre in Baga was said to be horrible.451 
Accurate information about events in the remote town of Baga near the Chad border 
has not been confirmed. If the first news turns out to be true, it will be the worst 
massacre in Boko Haram’s history, human rights organization Amnesty International 
said on Friday. (N77)452 
January 2015 continued with two suicide bomb attacks, both of which were 
made by approximately 10 year old girls.453 News about the Baga attack also 
became more detailed. Estimated deaths were said to be 2,000, more or less. 
Satellite images revealed the destruction in the area and Amnesty International 
said an estimated 3,700 buildings to have been destroyed. The Baga attack took 
place at the same time with the attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France, which 
was discussed earlier. 454 
Later in January Boko Haram fighters entered villages in Cameroon and 
kidnapped 80 people: adults who were mostly herdmen, and about 50 boys and 
girls the age 10–15.455 Three bomb attacks killed 58 and wounded about 140 
civilians in Maiduguri in March 2015.456  
At the end of April the Nigerian government announced to have released 
about 200 girls and 93 women from Boko Haram, but the Chibok schoolgirls were 
not among the released.457 Some days later the government announced to have 
released 234 girls and women more.458 According to the report of Amnesty 
international Boko Haram had kidnapped more than 2,000 women and children 
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during the previous one and a half years. The report stated that most of them had 
been forced to be sex slaves and fighters.459 
The next news about the attacks came in November 2015. In Diffa 13 
people were killed in an attack by Boko Haram.460 Two girl suicide bombers killed 
15 and wounded more than 100 people in the city of Kano.461 
The news about attacks and abductions continued in March 2016. In 
Maiduguri more than 20 people were killed in a mosque.462 But the big news was 
the report of Human Rights Watch report revealing that as early as on November 
24, 2014, Boko Haram had kidnapped a total of 400 women and children in the 
village of Damasaki. According to the village elders, in this attack more than 200 
residents were killed, and many died when trying to escape Boko Haram. Boko 
Haram also made the captured men bury the corpses into mass graves. According 
to a local government spokesman, the parents of the abducted children were afraid 
to tell about the attack. However, some of the escaped tried to inform the 
representatives in the Nigerian parliament about the case, but they were ignored.463 
In February 2018 Boko Haram attacked a school in Dapchi. In the attack 
111 schoolgirls were captured and went missing. It took, again, several days for 
the Nigerian government to admit that the girls were missing. These girls 
remained captured for five weeks before the army was able to release them. Five 
of the girls were reported to have gotten killed and one Christian girl, who did not 
want to convert to Islam, remained missing.464 
5.5 Community and compassion 
The case of the Chibok schoolgirls has raised a lot of compassion, not only in the 
Nigerian community but also internationally. The frame of community reaction 
was present in 33 of the news (31%). A total of 16 of the news articles (15%) 
dealt with the perspective of those who escaped or were released from Boko 
Haram. These people, together with the victims, also reported about the events 
during the capture or surviving Boko Haram. The victim’s perspective was framed 
in 18 of the news (17%).  
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In this frame theme group the community and compassion frames are 
divided into three subcategories; Community reaction, Escape or release and 
Victim’s perspective. 
5.5.1 Community reaction 
There are many elements of collective compassion in the news about the Chibok 
schoolgirls. In 33 of the news (31%), the families of the victims, the residents in 
the cities affected by Boko Haram’s attacks and the representatives of their 
communities showed courage and initiative after the attacks. In a wider context 
the whole community could be identified as victims of terror.465 
When the authorities were not reacting, the relatives joined their forces and 
their scant resources together to search for the girls.466 The residents were active 
also in the rescue efforts of the other abductions and in trying to prevent Boko 
Haram attacks. The families and relatives also had a role in identifying the girls 
from the videos that Boko Haram published467 and later when the girls were 
released. Parents also recognized those who claimed to be from Chibok but were 
not.468 
The news criticized using local security forces with insufficient armament in 
the fight against Boko Haram. 
Islamist rebels are opposed by local voluntary security forces, which, however, have 
limited resources. They have hunting rifles, assembled from car parts and pieces of 
wood at their disposal, while the opposing Boko Haram has RPGs (rocket-propelled 
grenades) and heavy machine guns. (N44)469 
The military has been accused of outsourcing front-line fighting to volunteer villagers 
and hunters. Volunteers have little training and their weapons are miserable. (N72)470 
The abduction touched almost everyone in Chibok; if the abducted was not 
one’s daughter, she was that of a neighbour or a relative.471 The news also 
reflected the variety of feelings the relatives had to go through, from the parents’ 
description of the desires the girls had in their studies and for their future, to the 
anguish and fear of their fate. 
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Another father, Pagu Haruna, told his abducted daughter Awan has been a hard-
working student. “We don’t know what’s going on with our kids in the woods, among 
strange men,” he said. (N8)472 
In addition to the local rallies in Nigeria the social media campaign 
#BringBackOurGirls also reflected the reactions of compassion and the strive to 
push the authorities into action to save the girls.473 The #BringBackOurGirls 
campaign first started in Abuja, Nigeria but got wide international attention after 
the former U.S. First Ladies Hillary Clinton and Michelle Obama and many 
celebrities and public personas like Malala Yousafza tweeted about it. The 
hashtag was retweeted in a short time more than three million times.474 It also was 
targeted towards the Nigerian government as a critique of the inactivity of the 
authorities. The campaign #BringBackOurGirls was referred to in seven of the 
news. 
There have been almost daily demonstrations in Nigeria on behalf of the abducted girls. 
At the same time, criticism has been targeted at the country’s government, which has 
failed to protect girls or protect civilians in the country’s Northeast. (N42)475 
The government representatives also reacted to the campaigns in public. 
“For the Chibok schoolgirls, pointing a finger is of no help,” said Brigade General 
Ibrahim Sabo, who introduced the report on Chibok’s abductions. 
"Getting the girls out of safely is much more important than the publicity created by the 
accusation, which tends to cover up the matter itself." (N46)476 
The social media activity also raised discussion and critique about the 
impact of liking and sharing a tweet. Retweeting was criticized to be 
“slacktivism”, with no impact on reality.477 In the news the “experts” also noted 
that an Internet campaign does not have any impact on the abducted girls, nor on 
Boko Haram.478 
While waiting for the results, the campaign will undeniably increase awareness of what 
happened. According to the critics, it is still mainly a matter of people easing their 
conscience without making an actual effort. (N21)479 
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Michelle Obama made a speech about the Chibok schoolgirls saying that 
she and the President of the U.S. were “outraged and heartbroken” over the 
abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls. She said Nigerian girls reminded the couple 
of their daughters.480 
Also, the official international response in the form of offering help, cited in 
the news, reflected compassion. 
The incident shocked even the Nigerians, who are accustomed to the violence of Boko 
Haram, and provoked a huge international reaction. The United States, among others, 
has promised help to free the girls. (N46)481 
The insurgency of Boko Haram and the violent attacks also caused the 
closing of schools in Northern Nigeria. For example, in Diffa where Boko Haram 
had attacked various times, the schools were closed and 47,000 of the 500,000 
inhabitants of the city were forced to leave their houses.482 
Schools in the Diffa area, with a total of 12,631 pupils, have had to close their doors 
“because of the insecurity that has led to the shortage of teachers and panic in the 
population”. (N98)483 
The community reaction was not just supportive or positive. According to 
UNICEF, in some cases Boko Haram’s use of children as suicide bombers had led 
to a fear of children, and consequently to suspicion and even to the discrimination 
of the ones that have been released from Boko Haram’s capture.484 The same 
applied to the survived former suicide bombers. Both are victims of Boko Haram. 
Instead of discrimination, children would need support and care, as many of them have 
been raped as prisoners of Boko Haram. (N104)485  
“These girls and women are just victims, and society needs to treat them accordingly. 
They have already experienced serious violence at the hands of Boko Haram. We need 
to make sure that they do not experience more violence in the hands of their 
compatriots,” says Aisha Muhammed Oyebode, according to AFP. (N103)486 
The life of former Boko Haram victims in their communities could have 
become difficult. The released women may have faced the same marginalization, 
as do their children, said the report of UNICEF.  
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They are rejected by families and communities “because of the social and cultural 
norms associated with sexual violence,” the UNICEF report states. 
Many believe that the blood legacy of Boko Haram's terrorists also lives in the 
offspring of the children of women who have become pregnant after having been raped. 
(N106)487 
The lives of the girls, who have escaped the claws of Boko Haram, are not easy either, 
as they often become outcasts even in their own families. They are not victims to be 
cared about, but a shame. The same thing happens to child soldiers, boys forced into 
guerrilla forces. (N108)488 
According to the Guardian, more than one-third of the abducted Chibok 
schoolgirls did not want to return home due to radicalization, forced marriages 
and sense of shame.489 
5.5.2 Escape or release 
The news about abductions and attacks were also stories of survival and escape. 
When the Chibok school attack took place, according to the authorities 14 girls 
were able to escape at once.490 Army representatives later revised the number of 
escaped Chibok schoolgirls to be 57.491 
In Kummabza village Boko Haram kidnapped more than 90 people in mid-
June, 2014.492 Of these, 60 women and girls were able to escape. The Nigerian 
army was reported to have killed 53 Boko Haram fighters in the attack.493 
For many, escaping Boko Haram’s attacks also meant fleeing from the 
home village. In February 2015 UNCHR estimated the number of refugees in the 
remote areas of Northern Nigeria to be more than a million people.  
More than a million people are estimated to have fled Northeastern Nigeria. Of these, at 
least 170,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries, according to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (N84)494 
The Nigerian army announced the liberation of “about 200 women and 93 
girls” in April 2015. The Chibok schoolgirls were not among the liberated.495 A 
week later the army announced liberation of 234 women and children.496 
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The army has said it has already released about 500 women and children from the vast 
forest of Sambisa in a few days. (N93)497 
The army brought the first 275 women and children to the city of Yola in the eastern 
part of the country. They had been transported out of the Boko Haram base area in the 
Sambisa forest by army flatbed trucks. The journey in the difficult terrain had taken 
three days. (N94)498 
A group of voluntary activist forces found the first of the missing Chibok 
schoolgirls, Amina Ali Nkeki, in the Sambisa forest, near the border of Cameroon 
in May 2015. Some days later another girl, named Serah Luka, was found, but her 
identity caused a debate. The representatives of the parents’ association in Chibok 
questioned her identity, but the army source insisted she was one of the Chibok 
schoolgirls. (N110)499 
In October 2016 Boko Haram released 21 Chibok schoolgirls after 
negotiations that were conducted with the representatives of International Red 
Cross and the Swiss government.500 The regathering was described to be full of 
tears, singing, dancing, and the joy of reunion. 
“I never imagined seeing my parents again. God has helped me and that is why I want 
to give thanks. May God comfort us all,” one of the released girls, Rebecca Mallam, 
told Reuters. (N116)501 
One of Chibok girls was found with a 10 months old baby in November 
2016 near the border of Cameroon.502 Three years after the Chibok abductions, in 
May 2017, the news told about the liberation of tens of abducted girls. The girls 
were exchanged with Boko Haram prisoners.503  
The Dapchi school attack in February 2018 recalled the abduction in 
Chibok. It also challenged the Nigerian army’s claims of a collapsing Boko 
Haram. In Dapchi 111 schoolgirls were abducted. Later, 105 of them were 
released and able to return to their homes. Five of the girls had been killed in the 
attack and one, refusing to convert to Islam, was kept in the capture.504 
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5.5.3 Victim's perspective 
When the Boko Haram soldiers attacked the Chibok school, the girls who 
survived later described how they had trusted the soldiers to be army 
representatives or with the police.505 The news later revealed that the authorities 
were aware of the attack before it happened, but did not prevent it.506 
Ugochi thinks Boko Haram isn’t the only one who considers girls worthless. When the 
first news of the abduction came, no one did anything. "Can this be real?" the Nigerians 
asked each other according to Ugochi. "I think the government was indifferent also 
because they were girls. A lot of people think it's natural to treat girls badly." (N39)507 
The perspective of the abducted and escaped girls has been present in the 
reports of the human rights organizations’ reports. These organizations also have 
required for the government’s responsibility in the protection and rehabilitation of 
the girls. 
 Human Rights Watch points out that the Nigerian government should also better 
protect and rehabilitate the released girls and track down the perpetrators. (N66)508 
According to the report cited in the HS news, the girls had been through 
mental and physical violence, raping and forced labour. They had also been 
tortured, forced into marriages and forced to participate in the attacks or suicide 
bombings. The report said that the government had not interviewed the girls 
although they could have had valuable information about the activities of the inner 
circle of Boko Haram.509 
According to the report, some of the girls were also forced to take part in the attacks 
and to carry terrorist weapons in the battles. Some girls were used as bait to lure 
Christian men directly to death. (N68)510 
The experiences the victims and eyewitnesses had to go through in the 
attacks could be described to be horrible. One of the survivors of Boko Haram’s 
suicide bomb attack in a school in Yobe state, in November 2014, described his 
reaction: 
 "When I realized what had happened, I pushed the corpse off over me and started 
running like everyone else. Flesh and blood of people had been spilled everywhere. 
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When my dad saw me, he was shocked. I hadn't noticed that my white school uniform 
was covered in blood," Adamu Abdullahi told the news agency AFP. (N71)511 
During the Boko Haram slaughter in Baga, January 2015, about 2,000 
people were killed. When the security forces arrived, they could not manage to 
count the huge number of the corpses. 
 He said the fighters had to give up the attempt to count the bodies because there were 
so many of them. Most of the victims had apparently been children, women and elderly 
who were unable to run fast enough, a local government spokesman said according to 
the release of the Nigerian government. (N77)512 
The victims and eyewitnesses told about extreme violence, sexual abduction 
and forcing to do acts unwillingly. The stories also described how the attacks 
could not be predicted, nor prevented. One of the news told about Aisha, who was 
abducted in the middle of a wedding. Boko Haram fighters arrived at the wedding, 
killed the men and abducted the women, including the bride. 
"Aisha" was imprisoned for three months before she managed to escape. During this 
time, she was raped several times, sometimes as many as six fighters raped her 
together. She was taught to use weapons and was sent, among other things, to attack his 
own village. 
According to Aisha, she did not kill anyone but knew women who had committed 
killings. She herself saw Boko Haram kill more than 50 people, including her sister. 
(N88)513 
Refusing to convert to Boko Haram’s interpretation of Islam or a forced 
marriage led to killings and experiencing and witnessing insane violence. Many of 
the victims were said to be severely traumatized and in the need of immediate 
crisis interventions. In addition to the violence, the women also suffered from 
insufficient hygiene. In the relocation camps the victims got food, shelter and 
tools for personal hygiene.514 
The stories of the released former Boko Haram victims also reveal signs of 
hope, of being alive. In the document describing the recovery of the Chibok 
schoolgirls in the government safe house in Abuja the girls support each other. 
 "Be thankful to God who kept you alive." Nigerian women who have been rescued 
from the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram are advised to be grateful. They also 
advise each other in this way, despite having seen and experienced brutal violence. 
(N125)515  
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The objective of this thesis was to study from the frame-building perspective how 
the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS) framed the case of the abducted 
Chibok schoolgirls in Nigeria, and what kind of sourcing and quoting patterns 
were found in the news during the period from April 2014 to December 2018. The 
data of this study is based on 105 news articles that HS published about the case 
or had a reference to. This chapter concentrates on the reflection of the findings of 
the data analysis. 
The case of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls became a story that gained 
international publicity, the development of which was also followed in HS. The 
case reflects reporting religion-related terrorism and its connectedness to a 
wartime situation, abductions and gender-based sexual violence towards women 
and under-aged girls. Most of the news about other Boko Haram attacks also 
included a reference to the Chibok schoolgirls case. In this sense, the continuing 
referencing to the case also redirected attention from later Boko Haram abductions 
and violent attacks, many with many more victims. The case is still active: more 
than 100 of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls remain captured or missing. 
The case also possesses many elements that fulfil the criteria of 
newsworthiness especially in reporting conflicts: it is deeply negative and has 
wide consequences like turning children to suicide bombers, destroying 
infrastructure, bombing schools and mosques, or forced religious conversions and 
marriages, and using sexual violence towards children. It also includes public 
persons, unexpected turns, and the perspective of internal and international 
politics and publicity. 
The study reveals that in reporting the Chibok schoolgirls’ case HS favoured 
material from the Western news agencies as sources in most of the news (75% of 
the news). The most referred individual news agencies were AFP (49%) and 
Reuters (38%). Media with international audiences was mentioned as a source 
type in 28% of the news. The third most used source type (15% of the news) was 
the human rights organizations which also are reporting about human rights 
violations from the victims’ perspective. Despite Nigeria’s lively and wide media 
space, also mainly accessible online, local Nigerian media was referred to as a 
source only in five percent of the news (5%). Nigerian media with direct access to 
local sources would have offered a wider perspective to understanding the cultural 
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and ethno-religious as well as political circumstances in the country. On the other 
hand, using news agency or other media materials in conflict reporting may mean 
taking distance or ignoring some difficult ethical challenges or considerations the 
journalists would have to meet in content selection. 
In this study, the categorization of the quote source types revealed that 
Nigerian authorities dominated in the citations in the news. They were cited in 
66% of the news. The perception of the high proportion of authorities’ citations in 
HS news mirrors the earlier studies which have found out that the official sources 
have their impact in shaping what becomes news, and newspapers prefer official 
sources in global conflict reporting. Official sources are also easier to find than 
conflicting voices and they are more easily recognized as legitimate commentators 
of facts. The second most quoted group were the representatives of human rights 
organizations in 32% of the news. The direct victims of Boko Haram’s violence 
were cited in 18% of the news, however, only one of these cited a released Chibok 
schoolgirl. 
The third phase of this study took a look at how the case of the Chibok 
schoolgirls was framed in the HS news. From the news data a total of 12 frame 
theme categories were recognized and these categories were further organized into 
four main theme groups: 1) Understanding the circumstances, 2) Government 
inactivity and politics, 3) Terrorism and violence, and 4) Community and 
compassion. 
In the frame theme group of “Understanding the circumstances” a 
description of Boko Haram and its objectives was recognized in 55% of the news. 
The news mainly stated repetitively and consistently the description of the group 
and its objective. A depiction of Nigeria in general was included in 13% of the 
news, and it mainly concentrated on the dichotomies of economy and religion: the 
poor and rural North versus the richer and more developed South, and the mainly 
Muslim North versus the Christian South. Only a little attention was paid on the 
colonial history under the British rule and its consequences to the development of 
the country.  
The unstable situation in the country has developed from a complex web of 
socio-cultural, economic, ethno-religious, and regional elements. The religious 
leaders of Nigeria have a visible role in politics, and politics and religion are 
intertwined in the country. Describing this complex relation, its historical 
background and its impact on daily politics in more detail would have given a 
96 
  
wider perspective to understanding the causes and consequences of the conflict in 
the country. In the HS news the religious and ethnic diversity of the country was 
recognized as a frame in 9% of the news. As a comparison, in Nigerian media 
ethnicity and religious affiliates have been recognized to be significant 
determinants in the news about Boko Haram.  
In the second frame theme group “Government inactivity and politics” more 
than half of the news (55%) told about the negotiations and international 
interventions to release the Chibok schoolgirls and to solve the conflict between 
the Nigerian government and Boko Haram. The description of the Nigerian 
government’s or security forces’ interventions was found in 35% of the news. 
However, the authorities’ often confusing statements, together with information 
about the government’s random attacks against civilians were reported like chains 
of events taking place, but without further critique or evaluation from the 
perspective of responsibility, truth value or human rights violations. The frame of 
false news or mistrust was recognized in 29% of the news. 
In the frame theme group “Terrorism and violence” the abduction of the 
Chibok schoolgirls was dealt in more detail in 74% of the news. HS described the 
fate of the girls in captivity and the news about their releases, but missed the 
follow-up or the recovery process of the liberated girls. Neutrality and the 
descriptive style in event reporting also meant that little attention was paid to 
evaluate the case from the human rights perspective. 
One third of the news (33%) discussed terrorism in general. Nigeria, 
together with Syria and Iraq, is among the countries with the most attacks of 
Islamic terrorism. However, it has been estimated that more civilians have been 
killed in the fight against terrorism than in the attacks made by Boko Haram. The 
role of the Nigerian government in the atrocities was recognized, but not widely 
discussed in the news. In addition to deaths and casualties, violence in Nigeria has 
caused displacement of millions of people and the closing of schools in Northern 
Nigeria. 
In 46% of the news about dozens of other attacks that took place in Nigeria 
the reporting seems descriptive, stating the attacks, their casualties and mainly 
also the Nigerian government’s – in many cases delayed - statement about the 
attack and its consequences. The news presented the conflict to be the 
government’s fight against Boko Haram, although the conflict in the country is 
reported to be more complex and between more parties than the two mentioned. 
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The last of the frame theme groups concentrated on the community reactions 
and compassion that was shown related to the abduction. The reactions of the 
communities of the victims were present in 31% of the news. The residents and 
volunteers have had an active role in fighting and opposing Boko Haram. The 
social media campaign #BringBackOurGirls, with public persons as its promoters, 
raised international awareness to the case and was also noticed in seven of the HS 
news. However, through its neutral reporting style HS avoided portraying the 
compassion towards the Chibok schoolgirls via the publicity that resulted from the 
actions of public persons. 
The news about Boko Haram’s attacks are also about survival, releases and 
escapes, and these themes were present in 15% of the news. When the news 
(17%) told about the victims of Boko Haram, it was mostly about describing the 
victims’ or eyewitnesses’ violent experiences during the attacks or the capture, or 
talking about the protection or needed rehabilitation of women and girls like the 
Chibok schoolgirls. Little attention was paid to boys or men who may have been 
abducted and forced to become Boko Haram fighters against their will. Also, the 
voices of returned but marginalized Boko Haram victims remained unheard. 
In general, the Chibok schoolgirls were depicted as a cohesive group of girls 
who are subjects of terrorism and collective violence. Despite the wide media 
coverage of the case, the schoolgirls’ story was told by others in the news or via 
the reports of human rights organizations. It also seemed that both the Nigerian 
authorities and Boko Haram were using the publicity of the Chibok schoolgirls as 
a bargaining chip in negotiations and in crafting a public image: Boko Haram 
from the perspective of intimidation, extortion, and negotiations of exchange, and 
Nigerian authorities as a means of internal and international politics.  
The theme of education is also a cross-cutting theme in the Chibok 
schoolgirls' case, but one only briefly discussed in Helsingin Sanomat. The 
rescued Chibok schoolgirls have gotten a chance to make choices regarding their 
future, and as such, they can be seen to be a privileged group in comparison to the 
other victims of Boko Haram in the rural and poor Northern Nigeria. However, 
portraying the Chibok schoolgirls in the news only as collective group of victims 
or subjects of government politics reduces their agency as individuals or active 





News IDs and details of the news used in this study are listed in the Appendix. 
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